Synchronizing federal operational planning for national catastrophes by Ithier, Jan P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2010-03
Synchronizing federal operational planning for
national catastrophes
Ithier, Jan P.













Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
SYNCHRONIZING FEDERAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING 








 Thesis Advisor:  Stanley Supinski 
 Thesis Co-Advisor: Nadav Morag 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2010 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for 
National Catastrophes 
6. AUTHOR(S) Jan P. Ithier 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER  
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
This thesis proposes the establishment of a Center for National Catastrophe Planning to address systemic 
problems in the planning for national catastrophes. The state of the art planning capabilities of the federal 
government do not include a structure to coordinate, validate and synchronize federal level operational 
plans effectively. Nor does it include the means to integrate non-federal stakeholders into the planning 
process. Since the Three Mile Island disaster, the governance structure has been modified after each 
major catastrophe to address major shortcomings that resulted in poor response performance by the 
federal government. These failures were consistently attributed to the lack of coordination and 
synchronization of federal operational plans with key stakeholders. Today, the federal government has a 
modernized governance framework but the core structure that caused the problems remains in place. The 
system is based on the assumption that the federal departments and agencies have the required planning 
capabilities and follow the governance structure as designed to develop, coordinate and integrate 
operational plans for catastrophes. History has proven the folly of this assumption. The Center for National 
Catastrophe Planning could effectively bridge these gaps by providing a structure with adequate authorities 
to integrate and synchronize federal operational plans.  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
141 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Operational Planning, Synchronization Of Plans, Federal Planning, 
Planning for Catastrophes, Catastrophe Planning, Integrated Planning, Multi-Sector Planning, 
Federal Operational Plans, Agency Operational Plans, Department Operational Plans 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
 
 
SYNCHRONIZING FEDERAL OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
FOR NATIONAL CATASTROPHES 
 
Jan P. Ithier 
Deputy Director, NORAD & USNORTHCOM, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
B.A., University of Puerto Rico, 1978 
M.S., University of Southern California, 1992 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes the establishment of a Center for National 
Catastrophe Planning to address systemic problems in the planning for national 
catastrophes. The state of the art planning capabilities of the federal government 
do not include a structure to coordinate, validate and synchronize federal level 
operational plans effectively. Nor does it include the means to integrate non-
federal stakeholders into the planning process. Since the Three Mile Island 
disaster, the governance structure has been modified after each major 
catastrophe to address major shortcomings that resulted in poor response 
performance by the federal government. These failures were consistently 
attributed to the lack of coordination and synchronization of federal operational 
plans with key stakeholders. Today, the federal government has a modernized 
governance framework but the core structure that caused the problems remains 
in place. The system is based on the assumption that the federal departments 
and agencies have the required planning capabilities and follow the governance 
structure as designed to develop, coordinate and integrate operational plans for 
catastrophes. History has proven the folly of this assumption. The Center for 
National Catastrophe Planning could effectively bridge these gaps by providing a 
structure with adequate authorities to integrate and synchronize federal 
operational plans. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
"We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
Union..." is not a statement proclaiming the birth of a perfect government. On the 
contrary, it is the beginning of the founding fathers’ new experiment, a purposely 
designed harmoniously dysfunctional system that balanced power and made 
unity of purpose subject to collaboration, all for one purpose and one purpose 
only, to preserve liberty. Since day one of this magnificent experiment, there has 
been an urge to improve the way the government is organized to keep up with 
the social, economic and political landscape. It is hard to imagine today that a 
person can be found in the United States that thinks that the federal government 
is perfect as it is and that it does not require change. On the contrary, a robust 
national debate is taking place, which has been given impetus by the seismic 
events of September 11, the war in Iraq, Hurricane Katrina and the economic 
crisis of 2009 that is questioning whether the current structures are up to the 
tasks of modern times. This debate has generated a tsunami of ideas to reform 
the federal government, and some may argue a need for modernizing our 
constitutional form of government.  
This thesis acknowledges that the federal government is in dire need of 
reform, especially in respect to national and homeland security. Advocates for 
change often refer to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as an example of the 
type of change needed. That may or may not be the case, but reform of that 
scale can take decades. Clearly, the trend in modern times is towards more 
integration and less stovepiping. The niche of this thesis is the area of 
operational planning for national level catastrophes, to build on that trend, 





forces to shape the federal government into a more modern and capable entity. 
With that in mind, the thesis first examines the problems that afflict the federal 
operational planning system.1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. The Void 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina 
were the defining events that jolted the federal government into a massive effort 
to develop a national system to prepare for and respond to 21st century 
catastrophes. This effort was influenced by the findings and recommendations 
from post-mortem investigations and assessments conducted by Congress, the 
executive branch and various think tanks. All identified critical shortcomings in 
the planning, coordination, and synchronization framework of the federal 
government thought to have contributed to the systemic failures experienced 
during these events.2  
The anniversaries of these events in 2010 find the United States with no 
viable structure to coordinate and synchronize federal agency operational plans.3 
This is evident in both the Integrated Planning System (IPS) and the National 
Response Framework (NRF) where both documents highlight the importance of 
horizontal and vertical coordination and synchronization but do not provide a 
mechanism to implement these processes effectively. Likewise, the IPS 
interagency standard operating procedures (SOP) requirement to submit plans 
for posting into the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) does not 
establish a synchronization process or structure (U.S. Department of Homeland 
                                            
1 According to the CPG 101, the purpose of operational planning is to provide a framework 
for tactical level plans and operations.  
2 Among these: 9/11 Commission Report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina–
Lessons Learned, 38, reports from the Government Accountability Office, numerous 
Congressional Research Service reports on both subjects, and several publications, reports and 
opeds on both subjects from prominent think tanks like the Center for International Strategic 
Studies, Heritage Foundation, Markle Foundation, Project for National Security Reform, etc. 
3 For simplicity, the document uses agency and department interchangeably unless 
specifically noted. 
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Security, 2009). This lack of a process or structure to coordinate and synchronize 
plans creates a void at the operational level, leaving the Secretary of Homeland 
Security responsible for coordination, but with no means to assess and 
synchronize federal agency plans adequately. Fundamentally, the federal 
government does not have a viable system for operational planning that provides 
a reasonable assurance that the departments and agencies have, and can 
provide the capabilities required during single or multiple national catastrophes. 
This void in the federal planning system can have severe consequences 
on the national preparedness and response posture during multiple catastrophic 
incidents because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has no means to 
identify available capabilities and the potential gaps, overlaps and duplication of 
these capabilities until an incident happens. In this void, DHS has the daunting 
task of coordinating federal preparedness and response efforts without the 
knowledge of other federal agencies' plans, capabilities and milestones. 
Notwithstanding, the 911 Commission, the Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 
numerous General Accounting Office (GAO) reports and recent reviews by the 
Obama Administration highlighting federal planning problems, no documented 
evidence exists that indicates this problem has been fixed. On the contrary, the 
lack of progress on developing operational plans for the National Planning 
Scenarios (NPS), and the fact that the Administration placed a moratorium on 
catastrophic planning, indicate that under the current construct, DHS cannot 
effectively drive the federal operational planning efforts.4 Complicating this matter 
is the fact that at the federal level, considerable confusion exists regarding who is 
in charge, which responsibilities are borne by what agencies, and whether assets 
and capabilities are guaranteed or merely potentially available for NPS level 
catastrophes (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 3). 
This void affecting the federal operational planning efforts is significant 
because it has impaired the ability of the federal government to develop the 
                                            
4 Both DHS and DOD planners stated to the author that planning was halted by the DRG. 
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required NPS plans to prepare for major national catastrophes. The evidence 
that the system is not working is obvious; four years have passed since the NPS 
list was published and only one required plan, the Terrorist Use of Explosives 
CONPLAN, has been completed (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009). 
Even though the fifteen scenarios were grouped into eight sets to simplify 
planning and significant, progress was made developing strategic plans and 
guidance, the operational planning effort continues to lag. At the present rate, it 
can take years to finish all the concept and operational plans.  
The federal government continues to struggle in developing effectively 
coordinated, measured and validated plans. GAO findings indicate that, in some 
cases, stakeholders were not involved in the planning; plans were not linked to 
other relevant plans; there was no system to track progress; and plans did not 
provide a method for accountability. It also found that DHS has not yet developed 
comprehensive operational plans and metrics to coordinate federal response 
resources (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. II).  
The cause of these problems is not at the strategic level since the federal 
government has a formal interagency process to develop policies, strategies and 
guidance that provide overarching direction to the departments and have been 
reasonably coordinated using the established national security process 
(Whittaker, Smith, & McKune, 2008, pp. 25–31).5 These documents are the 
collective product of the interagency process and apply to all federal 
departments. In contrast, operational plans are developed independently by 
every department to identify detailed resource, personnel and asset allocation to 
achieve the objectives of the strategic level documents (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009, p. 5–1). Generally, while one strategic document 
exists per scenario, there can be up to 30 associated operational plans from all 
the agencies that have homeland security responsibilities. Thus, the real issue is 
at the operational level where the IPS did not establish a system to coordinate, 
                                            
5 Every administration uses its own process. President Bush’s guidelines were published in 
NSPD-1, President Obama’s in PPD1.  
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synchronize and validate agency plans. This void affecting the federal 
operational planning efforts is significant because it has impaired the ability of the 
federal government to develop the required NPS plans to prepare for major 
national catastrophes; primarily, because the governance framework relies on 
individual federal departments to develop these plans and approve them based 
on their own interpretation of law and presidential guidance.6  
2. Problems with the Status Quo 
This existing framework creates significant problems for preparedness and 
operations. First, it does not establish a process for measuring agency plans for 
compliance with national strategies and concept plans. Second, it creates an 
environment where plans are developed in-house without a process to integrate 
or cross-level capabilities among agencies. Finally, it does not establish a system 
where agency capabilities can be screened to identify potential gaps or 
duplication.  
Although DHS has the lead for coordination, it does not have the authority 
to drive the process of other agencies and ensure the harmonization of 
operational plans for an integrated federal response. In other words, DHS has no 
way to ensure that the “parts” are up to specifications (plans are in compliance), 
have the appropriate “fit” (validation) and are delivered in the required timelines, 
quality and quantities (synchronization) to be able to produce the desired 
operational and tactical effects. These problems lead to other issues, such as the 
absence of a federal inventory of capabilities and a process to ensure that their 
development is consistent with strategies and plans (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 
2008, p. 10). This may be the reason why it is so difficult for the federal 
government to identify gaps and duplication of effort in many operational areas. 
The result is that the current planning system leaves validation of operational 
plans to the moment when an actual catastrophe occurs.  
                                            
6 Both HSPDs 5 and 8 include caveats in this regard.  
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In essence, the current federal framework for disaster preparedness does 
not adequately address the operational planning, coordination and 
synchronization problems for national level single or multiple major catastrophes.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
How can the federal government organize to coordinate and synchronize 
homeland security operational planning effectively? 
2. Secondary Questions 
What is the current federal government construct for synchronizing and 
coordinating homeland security operational planning and is it effective?  
What are the systemic strengths and weaknesses that affect the 
effectiveness of the federal planning and capabilities under the current construct?  
Are there any insights from international approaches that could be 
adapted to optimize the federal system?  
D. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the federal operational planning 
system and to propose an alternative approach to optimize the system in 
response to the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 10-123 report. It states 
that “DoD has its own operational plans for CBRNE consequence management 
but is unable to fully integrate them with other federal government plans because 
other federal departments and agencies have not completed all elements of the 
Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 
2007” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009, p. 3). Given that five of the 
eight National Planning Scenarios are CBRNE driven, this thesis seeks to 
improve the system to facilitate integration of plans between federal partners and 
the Department of Defense (DoD).  
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E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a combination of the case study and comparative 
analysis methods to examine the federal operational planning system and to gain 
insights about international approaches to emergency planning that can be 
applied in the United States. The case study was selected 
because most assessments of the federal planning system do not make a 
distinction between strategic and operational planning systems. Therefore, to 
obtain a better understanding of how well the system is performing, it is 
necessary to examine operational planning as a critical function. The case study 
describes the federal operational planning system and examines the governance 
structure to assess its performance using four parameters: outcomes, alignment, 
efficiency and effectiveness.7 The “quality” of the plans, strategies and policies is 
not within the scope of this thesis because they are the subject of a robust 
national debate and are the core purpose for numerous reform proposals (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. CRS-1). 
 Outcomes: capacity to meet the requirements set by national 
policies and strategies to generate the required plans for major 
catastrophes. This criterion uses the requirements set by HSPD-8 
and the National Planning Scenarios to assess whether the current 
system is performing as desired. 
 Efficiency: capacity to optimize the utilization of federal resources. 
This criterion examines whether a process or system exists that 
compensates for the disparity in maturity and resource levels of 
planning systems among the federal departments by pooling 
resources, establishing milestones and maintaining visibility over 
the development of department plans.  
 Alignment: ability to ensure that operational plans are consistent 
with strategy and policy objectives. This assessment establishes if 
a process for a qualitative review of department plans at the 
interagency level exists that checks alignment and established 
standards. It also assesses whether current responsibilities provide 
sufficient authority to drive alignment in the Interagency.  
 
                                            
7 Idea for the methodology was derived from the PNSR study Forging a New Shield, 2008. 
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 Effectiveness: a systemic approach to the coordination and 
synchronization of operational plans. This is the most critical 
element of the criteria and the one that carries the most weight. 
Synchronization of plans has to include a process that accounts for 
the optimal integration of capabilities that result in the reduction of 
gaps and duplication in terms of timing, space and purpose. The 
analysis of this element determines whether the system has a 
process that drives horizontal and vertical integration. 
In addition to this criterion, the thesis considers the effects of other 
variables on the system. In the area of operational planning, the capabilities 
among the federal departments are not homogeneous. Thus, in terms of 
interagency operational planning, any construct must address existing disparities 
in planning resources, experience, processes and expertise. 
The comparative analysis examine the emergency planning governance 
structures of Canada, Ireland and New Zealand to assess whether some of their 
emergency planning systems offer potential modifications that can be useful to 
improve the U.S. operational planning system.  
These countries were selected because they are representative of three 
different governance systems for emergency planning with specific 
authorities: overarching department, separation of planning and operational 
functions and multi-sector integration. The analysis examines authorities, 
organization and processes of emergency planning at the national level to gain 
insights for application in the United States. The result of this analysis is a 
proposal for a structural change to reorganize the federal operational planning 
system. 
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
 Chapter II provides a thorough analysis of the pertinent literature 
that has an impact on the federal operational planning system. It 
examines the literature that established the governance framework, 




 Chapter III is a case study of the federal operational planning 
system that includes its history, structure, processes and provides 
an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses resident in the 
system.  
 Chapter IV is a comparative analysis of selected international 
emergency planning structures that identifies principles for 
application in the United States. These principles are analyzed in 
the context of the federal operational planning system to determine 
if a new alternative can be developed to improve the current federal 
system.  
 Chapter V presents a new structure for the federal planning system.  
 Chapter VI provides conclusions to the research project, identifies 
future areas of research and gives closing thoughts. 
  
 10
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The subject of homeland security has fielded in a relatively short time a 
large compendium of publications that seek to provide an understanding of the 
complex and dynamic environment ushered in by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In this 
regard, it is possible to argue that Hurricane Katrina, without the context of 9/11, 
would have been just another Hurricane Andrew. In other words, it was surely 
catastrophic, but not enough in and of itself to usher in significant changes in the 
literature and, more importantly, in government organization. The context of 9/11 
brought the realization that a disaster of the scale of Hurricane Katrina inflicted 
by terrorists or nature could, in fact, bring the nation to its knees. In light of the 
understanding of the significance of these dangers, countless publications have 
appeared advocating reform of the National and Homeland Security systems. 
Many of these focus on terrorism, others focus on intelligence and a number of 
them analyze the federal organization for prevention, preparedness and 
response.  
A general consensus exists in the literature that a dire need to improve 
interagency planning, collaboration, coordination and information sharing for 
homeland security among the federal departments is necessary. The 9/11 
terrorist attacks started a trend in the literature that focused on the federal 
interagency system and this trend was further galvanized by the perceived 
failures of the federal government in responding to the Katrina disaster. The 
literature in this realm falls in two general categories: 1) federal government 
publications that provide a governance framework (legislation, directives, 
strategies, plans, etc.), and 2) publications that analyze the effectiveness of the 
governance framework (GAO, CRS, think tanks, academics, practitioners, etc.).  
 12
B. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 
Federal government publications provide the framework in which to study 
the government’s homeland security organization, processes and structures. In 
the legislative arena, Congress attempted to reform the Federal Government by 
enacting two key pieces of legislation: the 2002 Homeland Security Act and the 
2006 Emergency Management Reform Act. These acts set the framework for the 
federal government’s national and homeland security organization and processes 
in the Post-9/11 and Post-Katrina era. Most of the current literature focuses on 
improving or adding to these acts since the core theme is the need to 
supplement their mandates to resolve systemic organization, collaboration and 
process shortcomings appropriately. These deficiencies are thought to be the 
cause of the federal government’s failures when preparing and responding to 
major catastrophes. Some experts argue that the statutes and follow-on 
directives have generated some of the confusion and problems that the federal 
government experiences in homeland security operations (Wormuth & 
Witkowsky, 2008, pp. 3–10).  
The Executive Branch under the Bush Administration was prolific in 
publishing numerous directives, strategies and plans for developing a top to 
bottom framework on how the nation prepares and responds to disasters and 
incidents of national significance. The Bush Administration led this effort with the 
publication of Homeland Security Presidential Directives Five (HSPD-5) and 
Eight (HSPD-8). HSPD-5 designates the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security as the principal federal official for domestic incident 
management and makes him responsible for coordinating federal operations 
within the United States to prepare for, respond to and recover from terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies (Bush, HSPD-5, 2003). It also 
directs the development of a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) that seeks to standardize command 
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structures across jurisdictions.8 The NIMS and NRP, now the National Response 
Framework (NRF), seek to align all levels of government, non-governmental 
organizations and the private sector to work together for an all hazards response. 
The NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF 
provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident 
management (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1).  
HSPD-8 further designates the DHS Secretary as the principal federal 
official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the 
United States (Bush, HSPD-8, 2003). It was supplemented four years later by the 
publication of Annex I, which set in motion the development of the Integrated 
Planning System (IPS) published in 2009 (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2007). The IPS seeks to convert policies, strategies and planning 
guidance into a family of strategic, operational and tactical plans (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 1-1). The IPS and HSPD-1 virtually 
guarantee that all the Strategic Guidance Statements, Strategic Plans and 
Concept Plans (CONPLANs) produced by the Incident Management Planning 
Team (IMPT) in the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning at DHS and 
in the Operational Planning Branch of FEMA’s (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency) Disaster Operations Directorate are fully coordinated with full 
interagency participation.9 Although these directives generated a great deal of 
activity at the federal level that produced a number of strategic documents and 
plans, they did not solve the coordination and synchronization problems among 
federal agencies (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 11). 
In addition to these documents, the federal government published several 
key strategies that seek to provide direction and guidance to the Homeland 
                                            
8 NRP was superseded by the National Response Framework (NRF) on January 2008. 
9 The IPS provides a detailed description of the coordination process. HSPD-1 is the Bush 
Administration’s directive that structures the IA process for homeland security. President Obama 
rescinded HSPD-1 with Presidential Policy Directive One (PPD-1) which consolidated the NSC 
and the HSC staffs and established the IA process for his administration. FEMA is responsible for 
developing federal CONPLANs.  
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Security community. Among these, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 
and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, seek to provide the federal 
departments the strategic context and direction for their roles in the security and 
protection of the homeland. However, all the Executive Branch documents are 
based on the premise that federal agencies have the required planning 
capabilities, voluntarily comply and effectively develop programs to enhance 
interagency collaboration, coordination, information sharing and planning efforts. 
While there is a high emphasis in collaboration and integration, the failure to 
address the “how” serves to preserve and encourage departmental autonomy. 
For instance, there a conspicuous absence of a process to establish clear 
strategy-to-task links (end-to-end). Nor is there a compliance framework that 
measures whether the federal departments are meeting requirements 
established by policy and strategy in the development of their programs. Lastly, 
no structure exists to ensure that federal department programs are synchronized 
to maximize capabilities and minimize duplication of efforts and gaps in 
homeland security activities. Throughout the documents, there is no thought of 
modernizing the organizational structures of the federal departments to optimize 
capabilities and minimize the traditional “stovepipes.” 
On the contrary, the plans produced in this system place the responsibility 
for developing, coordinating and synchronizing operational plans squarely on the 
shoulders of each department. They are given the responsibility in their own 
terms to perform these functions with other federal departments and non-federal 
jurisdictions. The system has produced five strategic guidance statements, four 
strategic plans and a single CONPLAN, which seek to provide guidance and 
identify roles and responsibilities for the federal departments (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 100). Typically, these documents do not include 
any metrics of performance other than listing the tasks expected from the 
departments including developing operational plans for each scenario. In 
essence, these documents are an extension of the loose governance system 
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described above, which assumes that multiple departments have an equal 
capability and drive to meet these requirements.10 The Obama Administration in 
its first year in office has not radically altered the system.  
A good number of senior officials in the administration were members of 
prominent think tanks and academic institutions with bona fide credentials and 
expertise in the area of homeland security. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
administration placed a moratorium on NPS catastrophic planning to provide 
maneuver space while it re-examines the policies, processes and structures of 
the Homeland Security Enterprise. The administration directed the consolidation 
of the national security and homeland security staffs. It is also working on 
developing new strategies for National and Homeland Security that shape the 
strategic and operational environments. DHS conducted its first ever Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which indicates that the administration 
intends to revise HSPD-8 and the IPS. The purpose of the recently published 
QHSR is to “outline a framework to guide the activities of participants in 
homeland security toward a common end” (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010, p. iii). It signals that the administration intends to broaden the 
focus beyond terrorism, develop a new homeland security planning system, and 
expand the role of non-federal stakeholders. The administration’s potential 
review of HSPD-8 and the IPS may not significantly change current planning 
structures but could place less weight on the national planning scenarios. Both 
the QHSR and ongoing review efforts recognize that states, private sector and 
non-governmental organizations are essential for planning but do not outline a 
way ahead for their full integration into the federal planning system. In essence, 
the direction seems to lean towards more governance at the federal level that 
preserves the traditional autonomy of the departments in developing operational 
plans.  
                                            
10 Author analysis of tasks in the documents produced to date. These documents are FOUO 
will not be cited in this thesis. 
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It is possible that the Obama administration’s approach can be an 
improvement over the current federal operational planning system. However, as 
discussed below, governance that relies in voluntary compliance without 
structures and processes does not have a great track record. In effect, the record 
shows that core problems persist as demonstrated by the reoccurring findings of 
most investigations and assessments conducted by organizations that examined 
federal performance. 
The federal planning system currently resides within the structure of the 
national security system and in parallel to the intelligence community. The 
statutes and a long list of executive orders and presidential directives established 
over the years the framework from which the present structures evolved.11 
Significant among them and having direct relevance to this thesis are President 
Carter’s Executive Order (EO) 12148, which established the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and President Bush’s EO 13354 that established the 
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). FEMA was the originator of the first 
Federal Response Plan coordinated and signed by all agencies with disaster 
response responsibility (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1992). 
This document later became the National Response Plan that took the federal 
government to Katrina. These documents are the core structure of the federal 
response system that remains in place today. The creation of the NCTC is 
relevant because both the executive order and the statute that created it, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (ITRPA) of 2004, established a 
new structure responsible for the coordination and synchronization of the 
intelligence community strategic operational planning for counter terrorism. 
NCTC’s planning efforts include broad, strategic plans, such as the landmark 
National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP). First approved by the 
President in June 2006 and then again in September 2008, the NIP is the USG’s 
comprehensive and evolving strategic plan to implement national counter 
terrorism (CT) priorities into concerted interagency action (U.S. National Counter 
                                            
11 For a complete list, see FAS.org. 
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Terrorism Center). While these documents are classified, they are indicative of 
an evolving coordination and synchronization structure in one of the most 
challenging stovepipe communities.  
C. PUBLICATIONS THAT ANALYZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
In 2006, DHS led a comprehensive review of the national planning system 
to determine the status of catastrophic plans in the states, territories and urban 
areas in response to mandates from a presidential directive and legislation. The 
review concluded the current status of plans and planning gives grounds for 
significant national concern. Current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and 
not linked within a national planning system. This is incompatible with 21st 
century homeland security challenges, and reflects a systemic problem: 
outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary contributors to the 
inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of the review support the need 
for a fundamental modernization of the U.S.’s planning processes (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. viii). This study informed the blitz of 
activity that led to the development of the current federal governance framework 
that attempted to solve the catastrophic planning problems in the homeland 
security system.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has published hundreds of 
reports assessing the effectiveness of the federal departments and programs in 
the area of homeland security.12 Key among these, are those reports that 
highlight a reoccurring theme addressing problems of command structures, 
coordination, collaboration, and information sharing. In his testimony before the 
House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and 
Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director 
GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice, summarized the findings of several GAO 
engagements that identified shortcomings on leadership roles, planning, 
                                            
12 See www.GAO.gov, key word: Homeland Security. Note: a search of homeland security in 
the title yielded 273 reports. 
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coordination and the inventory of federal capabilities for major disasters. GAO 
contends that effective federal preparation for and response to such an event 
requires planning, coordination, cooperation, and leadership within DHS and 
between DHS and other federal agencies—civilian and military—as well as state 
and local governments, and the private and nonprofit sectors, which have 
resources and capabilities needed for the response (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2008, p. 2). Most recently, GAO in addressing Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Explosives (CBRNE) planning stated 
that DoD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not 
integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have not 
completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by 
Presidential directive in December 2007 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2009, p. 3).  
While GAO has appropriately identified these problem areas, its 
recommendations for improvement tend to be open-ended and not systematic. 
For instance, addressing the lack of clarity in leadership roles and inadequacy of 
plans for pandemic influenza GAO recommends: (1) DHS and Health and 
Human Services (HHS) develop rigorous testing, training, and exercises for 
pandemic influenza to ensure that federal leadership roles and responsibilities 
are clearly defined, understood, and work effectively, and (2) the HSC set a time 
frame to update the plan, involve key nonfederal stakeholders, and more fully 
address the characteristics of an effective national strategy (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2007). GAO supports the “Lead Agency” model of federal 
organization and assumes that the current structures and systems of the federal 
government are adequate and place high emphasis on more agency 
collaboration and exercising to solve these issues. However, their own findings 
indicate that the model is ineffective because DHS does not have the authority to 
direct action or compliance from other federal departments.13  
                                            
13 Only the President has that authority, see IPS, p. 3. 
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Similarly, the Executive Branch’s assessment of the federal response 
during Hurricane Katrina identifies analogous shortcomings as GAO and makes 
the same assumptions when proposing its 125 recommendations. The federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned report concludes that 
insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination are not problems that 
began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the need for 
greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only 
throughout the federal government, but also with the state and local governments 
and the private and non-profit sectors as well (U.S. Executive Office of the 
President, 2006, p. 50). However, the report’s 125 recommendations support the 
concept of “Lead Agency,” the independence of federal departments to develop 
their own plans, and giving DHS the difficult task to coordinate their action 
without a change in authorities or establishing mechanisms for compliance. 
Furthermore, the recommendations further muddle leadership roles and 
authorities by proposing new leadership roles and authorities for federal 
department coordinating officers. Both the GAO and Lessons Learned reports 
aptly describe the conditions that afflict the national Homeland Security 
structures but their solution set tends to stay within the confines of the stovepipe 
system of the traditional federal departments. None of the reports offers any 
novel or drastic solutions to a complex and demanding problem; that job is left to 
think tanks and academia.  
A substantial number of authoritative experts who advocate a wide range 
of proposals that address the weaknesses and gaps of the federal operational 
planning system has further developed the analysis of the governance framework 
of the national security system. Most solution sets range from the strategic 
realignment of authorities and power at the federal level to the implementation of 
novel organizational models for national and homeland security. While there 
seems to be a consensus that interagency challenges exist at the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels, most proposals take a unitary approach in trying 
to apply fixes and recommendations across the board.  
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Among those advocating for a strategic realignment of authorities and 
power are three major publications exerting considerable influence in the debate 
on how to fix the federal homeland security challenges. The Project for National 
Security Reform (PNSR) massive report Forging a New Shield and Turning Ideas 
into Action, and the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) project provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
shortcomings and strengths of the National and Homeland Security systems and 
make significant recommendations from a group of luminaries in the academic, 
government and practitioner fields.14 Both PNSR reports focus major fixes at the 
strategic level by proposing the modification of the National Security Council 
structure, increasing the authority of the national security staff and creating a 
variety of interagency structures in an attempt to reduce the complexity and span 
of control of the national security system.  
The PNSR goes further than the CSIS Project by proposing Congressional 
reform to align committees with the recommended national security changes. 
The study cautions about an “à la carte approach to reform” since the “themes 
and recommendations are dependent on each other for their effectiveness no 
less than a building‘s foundation, superstructure and functional systems must be 
conceived as an aggregate for any part of it to work as intended” (Project for 
National Security Reform, 2008). In all fairness, the PNSR does not 
underestimate the uphill battle that such a momentous change can produce. In 
their own words:  
The sweeping recommendations made here will require careful and 
progressive implementation, yet all too often reform proposals are 
offered and adopted without due attention to the innumerable 
difficulties that arise during implementation. For example, a 
Congressional Research Services review of past reorganizations 
leading up to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security 
found that in most cases,―serious concern with implementation 
[was] typically too little and too late. An advisor to PNSR with over 
thirty years of experience in organizational reforms advised that all 
                                            
14 Several of which are occupying key positions in the Obama Administration. 
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of her experience taught that the success or failure of 
organizational reforms boils down to sustained and attentive 
implementation. Not yet knowing whether or how Congress and the 
president might adopt the recommendations offered here, we can 
only identify general principles for effective implementation, 
beginning with careful attention to our nation‘s constitutional 
framework. (Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 600) 
PNSR’s Turning Ideas into Action seeks to establish a practical path for 
the Obama Administration to implement the overhaul of the national security 
system. In this report, PNSR re-emphasizes the systemic deficiencies in the 
national security system, including homeland security, which in their view has not 
been resolved. Their list is long: 
The current system is built of disjointed stovepipes that don’t 
connect sufficiently well to address complex problems. The results 
are predictable. Crisis management takes precedence over long-
term strategic management. Redundancy and turf wars among 
agencies preclude whole-of-government approaches. Individual 
departmental missions take precedence over national missions. 
National strategy and planning guidance are missing. Resources 
and priorities are misaligned. Interagency cooperation is not 
encouraged. Diverse subcultures, incompatible protocols, and 
outdated technologies prohibit information sharing. Congressional 
oversight is fragmented. (Project for National Security Reform, 
2009, p. iii) 
PNSR outlines the building blocks of reform, implementation initiatives, 
and specific steps the nation must take to move from the national security system 
it has to the national security system it needs (Project for National Security 
Reform, 2009, p. ii). Nevertheless, their streamlined recommendations from 
Forging a New Shield can still require a major effort involving the Executive 
Branch and Congress. Both these reports included comprehensive sections on 
homeland security and proposed a number of recommendations that aligned with 
their overall vision of a modern national security system. These sections, in turn, 
were refined by their December 2009 Recalibrating the System report, which 
concluded that catastrophic operational planning is at the crux of the National 
Preparedness System. PNSR recognized that the system has been steadily 
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improving, specifically at the regional level, which led them to conclude that 
catastrophic planning should focus on evolving regional efforts (Project for 
National Security Reform, 2009, p. 5). The PNSR recommendations, no matter 
how they are cut, requires major muscle movements in the Executive and 
legislative branches. Dr. Richard W. Stewart argues that finding a permanent 
interagency solution like a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency is, if not 
impossible, a least very, very hard (Stewart, 2008, p. 162). Besides the obvious 
resistance from Congress to reform itself, the dysfunctional structure created by 
the founding fathers and the lack of an homogenous culture among the federal 
departments pose near insurmountable obstacles to implementation. Even if their 
regional catastrophic planning proposals were adopted, the problem at the 
federal level would not be fixed. 
In contrast, the CSIS study, while advocating similar large-scale changes 
in the national security system, is more dependent on executive branch directed 
governance than legislative action. Like PNSR, they recommend significantly 
strengthening the National Security Council since, in their view, unity of effort 
requires coordination from the top, the BG-N study team recast the National 
Security Council (NSC) from its traditional role of preparing decisions for the 
President to more active involvement in ensuring that Presidential intent is 
realized through USG actions. A stronger NSC role in providing policy oversight 
during planning and execution, however, does not mean that the NSC staff 
should be involved in the conduct of operations. Rather, the study team 
recommends that the NSC establish a new NSC Senior Director and office 
responsible for developing the Presidential guidance for complex contingency 
operations and ensuring that interagency planning for these operations is fully 
integrated. One of the most important initial responsibilities of this new office 
would be to develop and codify a standard approach to interagency planning at 
the strategic level (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, p. 8).  
This view is reflected as well in the in the area of homeland security 
planning, where their follow-on report, Managing the Next Catastrophe, 
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recommends the creation of a Senior Director of Strategic Planning at the NSC 
and the establishment of a “robust interagency organization overseen by the 
NSC but housed at DHS” (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 10). The viability and 
effectiveness of these recommendations is doubtful. First, executive action does 
not permanently institutionalize the structures with adequate authorities; second, 
as the PNSR argues, increasing the span of control of the NSC leads to 
inefficiencies in the system unless substantial changes take place; and third, the 
assumption that the NSC as structured has the power and authority to exercise 
leadership over autonomous and highly independent federal departments is 
questionable (Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 166).  
While all these proposals may have merit for a much-needed overhaul of 
the national security system, their complexity and scope can require years if not 
decades to implement. Needless to say, an overhaul on this scale and 
complexity can likely generate an emotional and protracted debate as the one 
experienced by health care reform legislation since it also challenges traditional 
sources of power, resources and more importantly, budgets. The unitary 
approach to solving issues across the spectrum (strategic, operational and 
tactical) may not resolve the short to mid-term operational level issues of 
planning, collaboration, coordination and information sharing among the 
departments. Furthermore, these reports tend to preserve the autonomy of 
federal departments and rely on voluntary cooperation as a way ahead, which is 
the crux of problem. While these reports seek to reform the national and 
homeland security systems, a few publications propose using operational models 
for a variety of missions in homeland security. 
This school of thought has its origin in military Senior Service Colleges 
where officers are trained on the operational and strategic levels of war. 
Therefore, it follows that the Combatant Command and the Joint Interagency 
Task Force (JIATF) models are the center of these proposals. The problem with 
this type of literature is that it tends to militarize a complex and dynamic 
environment consisting of multiple federal departments that cannot and will not 
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submit to a military style chain of command. Additionally, these conceptual 
constructs apply a good example of interagency cooperation outside the United 
States without addressing the significant structural, cultural and legislative 
barriers for implementation in the homeland. Thus, they tend to oversimplify the 
complex interagency system and its functional challenges in the homeland. It is 
not that these models cannot be applied, the issue that needs to be addressed is 
one of scope and focus. Colonels Sami Said and Cameron Holt illustrate this 
point effectively in their article “A Time for Action - the Case for Interagency 
Deliberate Planning” (Said & Holt, 2008). Although their article focuses on the 
National Security System and U.S. Foreign Policy, it makes the case that the 
interagency collaboration and coordination problems can be solved by 
establishing a deliberate planning system. They illustrate that most of the 
approaches described above have significant barriers for implementation and 
may not be achievable. In their analysis, the most viable and obtainable fix is to 
develop a system that brings the federal departments together to develop the 
nation’s plans. This approach is further justified by organizational literature that 
advocates horizontal or hybrid organizations for complex or dynamic 
environments (Burkle & Hayden, 2001).  
D. OTHER LITERATURE OF INFLUENCE 
The literature advocating for the reform and modernization of the 
intelligence community is as abundant and diverse as that addressing the ills of 
the national homeland security system. Since 9/11, the calls for reform of the 
intelligence community have also gained momentum and a community of interest 
is advocating for its modernization. Key among these is the Markle Foundation 
Task Force on National Security for the Information Age. The task force 
produced a series of reports mostly focused on information sharing and 
intelligence. They highlighted systemic deficiencies in the system at various 
levels and provided recommendations for improvement. Significant to this thesis, 
is their April 2009 report Reforming the Culture of National Security, which did 
not support the restructuring of the national security architecture, advocating 
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instead, for a transformation in culture that encourages and rewards integration 
of information sharing and interagency collaboration (Markle Foundation, 2009). 
Their recommendations include clarification of roles and responsibilities, focus 
collaboration and information sharing, creation and institutionalization of 
accountability mechanisms, and the clear delineation of authorities and 
responsibility (Markle Foundation, 2009). In essence, their recommendation 
seems to advocate for stronger leadership roles in the system, as well as more 
effective governance. 
On the other hand, some authors have argued that organizational 
structure matters and question whether the intelligence agencies built for a 
different enemy at a different time can adapt to the current threat environment 
(Zegart, 2007, p. 197). In their discussion, several authors note that the National 
Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is a positive development, but not without 
challenges, for increasing the coordination and synchronization of counter 
terrorism planning. Key among these challenges is the lack of adequate 
authorities for the NCTC to fulfill its mission. Amy Zegart, in her book, Spying 
Blind highlights the turf battles within the intelligence community that led to a 
wither-down IRTPA, and thus, a weakened NCTC. Brian R. Reinwald in 
Assessing the National Counterterrorism Center’s Effectiveness in the Global 
War on Terror posits that the lack of appropriate authorities affected the NCTC’s 
ability to perform in an effective manner the mission assigned by IRTPA. He 
concluded that the United States requires a single federal entity focused on 
GWOT (Global War on Terror) counterterrorism strategy with the necessary 
authorities to integrate intelligence, conduct comprehensive interagency 
planning, compel specific action when required, and coordinate and synchronize 
the elements of national power for successful operations (Reinwald, 2007, p. 15). 
The literature in the intelligence highlights similar systemic challenges to those 
affecting the homeland security system. Specifically, the issue of authorities is 
highly relevant since their lack-of usually constrain the effectiveness of 
interagency organizations. Chapter V, in particular, explores this area.  
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In the psychology field, growing evidence exists that supports the adoption 
of interagency structures for homeland security. Douglas Paton and John Violanti 
make a compelling case that joint planning activities are necessary to reduce the 
risk of stress during disasters or terrorist incidents. In their own words, “extensive 
joint planning in conjunction with team work activity involving collaborating 
agencies can reduce the risk of experiencing adverse stress outcomes, 
particularly when responding in a multiagency context” (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, 
Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 239). A reoccurring problem during major 
disasters is the unintentional lack of information sharing or as Joseph W. Pfeifer 
calls it, “stovepipe situational awareness,” that result in a general lack of 
understanding of the capabilities, plans and intentions among the federal 
agencies (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 2007, p. 208). 
Gaps and overlaps of capabilities are the first manifestation on the ground that 
precedes the unraveling of well-intentioned plans. As agency plans fail to achieve 
the synergy required of a multi-sector response, it creates huge challenges that 
must be solved on the fly under enormous pressures. In the psychological realm, 
interagency planning provides maneuver room to overcome the complexity, scale 
and uncertainty of mega disasters without the pressures and timelines of life and 
death decisions that can quickly overwhelm human capacity.  
A developing genre is developing in the literature that advocates the shift 
from interagency planning to multi-sector planning. This school of thought is 
perfectly exemplified by the book Megacommunities: How Leaders of 
Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges 
Together and New Zealand’s doctrinal publications for emergency management 
(Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008).15 The central premise is that 
the complexities, interrelationships and scale of the modern environment are of 
such magnitude that government solutions are not adequate to respond to 
challenges. Therefore, the government must enter a partnership with the private 
                                            




sector and civil society to ensure the development of holistic solutions to 
problems that optimize the collective employment of capabilities.16 The emphasis 
in the QHSR report to integrate non-federal jurisdictions and NGOs is evidence 
that this idea seems to be gaining some traction in the United States as well. 
Lastly, a literature review in this subject area would be incomplete without 
considering the writings of the two former Secretaries of the Department of 
Homeland Security. Both Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff provide interesting 
insights on the struggles faced by DHS as it grew as the newest department of 
the federal government. What makes their books interesting is the fact that both 
secretaries helped create a system that assumes that the DHS must lead and 
influence the national planning efforts. Their accounts suggest that DHS role is to 
lead other departments in matters of homeland security. Thus, it is not news that 
both secretaries eagerly protected this role by presiding over a system that 
utilized a top-down approach in their relationships with non-federal jurisdictions 
and paid little attention to the latent capabilities of the private sector and NGO’s. 
As discussed before, DHS under their administration was repeatedly criticized by 
GAO for failing to include non-federal stakeholders in the development of plans.  
E. ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE 
As previously seen, extensive literature exists about the federal 
development of the federal homeland security structure. A large portion of this 
literature consists of federal publications that seek to provide a structure for a 
complex and dynamic system. The vast federal governance data provides a 
window by which to assess the planning system’s organization, structure and 
processes, as well as the policy and strategic objectives that they seek to 
achieve. The literature that documents the “ills” and recommendations for 
improvement is equally extensive. The government self-assessments document 
system shortcomings and propose solutions within the current organizational 
                                            
16 In this context, it includes Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), associations, and 
any organization that can be a potential stakeholder. 
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framework of the federal system. Typically, they are the post mortem of 
catastrophic events where the federal government did not perform as expected. 
These assessments have led to the reorganization of the government and the 
creation of new structures for addressing the failures discovered or perceived 
after the incident. Examples of these are the creation of FEMA, DHS, the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence and the NCTC. Clearly, the 
reorganizations, past and present, have not solved the problems that led to their 
creation. On the contrary, their missteps over the years are well documented and 
have generated a virtual cottage industry for government reform.  
The advocates of reform are as numerous as their number of proposals 
for improving the national security system, which makes consensus difficult to 
achieve. Most of this literature focuses on broad reform that can be difficult to 
achieve and result in protracted timeless battles while the stakeholders vie to 
retain power and control over resources. Conversely, the few short-term 
organizational proposals in the literature are not optimal because they seek to 
establish a command and control system over an interagency structure. These 
initiatives are a poison pill for federal departments because it requires them to 
forfeit authorities and resources. The trials and tribulations of the intelligence 
community are worth considering as it has been battling similar issues since the 
interagency system was created. The literature documenting the NCTC provides 
some potential organizational ideas to apply for catastrophic planning. 
Substantial data exists to back the criticism levied upon the federal planning 
system. The proposals for reform are equally substantiated by an extensive case 
study data that documents what works and what does not. The challenge of 
reform, especially an overhaul, becomes a matter of achieving a general 
consensus, developing momentum for change, and making it happen before the 
next mega-catastrophe strikes. Considering that the Goldwater-Nichols Act is a 
result of decades of debate on the organization of the defense establishment, it is 
appropriate; no, it is imperative other options are studied to achieve the same 
goals in shorter time spans for the good of the nation. 
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III. THE FEDERAL PLANNING SYSTEM 
Unfortunately, today’s efforts to provide homeland security, 
particularly at the federal level, are not unlike the governmental 
equivalent of a children’s soccer game. One can see a tremendous 
amount of activity under way and considerable energy on the field, 
but the movements are often not very well coordinated. Players 
tend to huddle around the ball—in this case, whatever happens to 
be the crisis or headline issue of the day—and follow it wherever it 
goes, even if in doing so they neglect their assigned positions. In 
such an environment, it is not impossible to score a goal, but that 
outcome is usually due more to luck than to skill. (CSIS Managing 
the Next Catastrophe, Ready (or Not)?) 
A. HISTORY 
It took the global scale of a world war and several strategic failures for the 
United States to realize that the 19th century federal structure was not up to the 
tasks of the 20th century. The hard lessons of World War II and the emerging 
conflict between the free world and communism led Congress to codify an 
interagency structure to serve as a consultative body to coordinate national 
strategic policy and intelligence efforts (Whittaker, Smith, & McKune, 2008, p. 7). 
The 1947 National Security Act that established the national security system 
created the National Security Council (NSC). During the Cold War, the NSC 
became the structure responsible for coordinating and synchronizing U.S. policy 
and strategy but it left operational planning as the domain of the federal 
departments. The primary focus of the national security system was external 
while domestically, the President relied on the cabinet meetings to address 
issues in the homeland. The March 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) disaster was 
the starting point for a nascent domestic interagency process to attempt to 
coordinate and synchronize the emergency response efforts of multiple federal 
agencies in the homeland.  
Before Three Mile Island, federal emergency and disaster activities were 
fragmented and distributed across numerous agencies (U.S. Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2009). Unlike typical reoccurring disasters (hurricanes, 
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earthquakes, floods, etc.), which confined federal efforts to supplementing state 
and local relief activities, the TMI nuclear incident opened a Pandora’s Box of 
consequences, complexities and challenges that shook the notions of federal 
emergency preparedness. The nation had suffered many disasters before, but 
TMI, while not a major disaster per se, surfaced the specter of a potential nuclear 
catastrophe in the homeland and thoroughly tested the federal system by 
demonstrating a need for coordinated action among multiple federal departments 
and non-federal entities. The underlying problem was a lack of attention at the 
federal and state levels to plan and prepare for disasters of this scale (Miskel, 
2006, p. 73). As a result President Carter issued Executive Order 12148, which 
gave FEMA the responsibility to “establish federal policies for, and coordinate, all 
civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and 
assistance functions of Executive agencies” (Carter, 1979). TMI was the 
proverbial “aha” moment that made the federal government assume a more 
vigorous and proactive approach towards emergency planning and establish a 
system for coordination of preparedness efforts (Miskel, 2006, p. 63). 
This approach solely rested on the shoulders of FEMA since it did not 
have specific authorities to evaluate and integrate federal planning efforts. 
Departments were expected to develop their own plans based on their own 
statutory responsibilities and priorities. In the 1980s, FEMA developed a series of 
plans for catastrophic earthquakes that later would become the blueprint for 
future Federal Response Plans (Miskel, 2006, p. 11). These plans sought to 
assign responsibility to multiple agencies and coordinate federal response. The 
decade was good to FEMA since not all of the disasters in the United States 
were of significant magnitude and scale to challenge the federal response. Thus, 
FEMA’s ability to coordinate federal emergency planning efforts of the federal 
government remained untested until Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew. Both storms 
were perceived as a federal failure and thoroughly tarnished FEMA’s reputation 
as it was held responsible for the poor coordination and synchronization of the 
federal response. Even though by the time Andrew rolled ashore FEMA had a 
 31
Federal Response Plan signed by 27 head of agencies, the plan was generally 
ignored in practice by most of the responsible agencies (Miskel, 2006, p. 83).  
FEMA, as the sole agency responsible for preparedness and response, 
became the target of political attacks and was the subject of outrage from local 
officials, senators and congressmen (Kamen, 2008). The post-mortem reports 
from GAO and the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) coupled 
with the perceived inability of FEMA to perform, rekindled once again political 
pressures to improve the federal emergency management system. At the time, 
the problem of interagency coordination was of such magnitude that it prompted 
the GAO to recommend the appointment of a senior White House official to 
oversee federal preparedness and response (Government Accountability Office, 
1993, p. 2).  
The Clinton Administration did not adopt the recommendations of NAPA or 
the GAO. Instead, it reorganized FEMA under a robust leadership cadre but did 
not change the way operational planning was conducted at the federal level. 
FEMA was still responsible for coordination but had no real authorities for this 
function. FEMA under the leadership of James L. Witt was able to regain is 
reputation by responding effectively to the Loma Prieta and North Ridge 
earthquakes and with the personal intervention of President Clinton, the Midwest 
floods (Miskel, 2006, p. 89). This period may have been FEMA’s golden age, but 
no catastrophes would really challenge and strain the federal system during until 
2005. In this environment, the federal government continued to rely on a system 
that had already two narrow escapes when the scale and magnitude of the 
disasters required a coordinated and synchronized government effort. Up to this 
point in history, no interagency structure in the federal government existed that 
was responsible for the development of coordinated domestic policies and 
strategies. The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed that. The attacks, whilst a 
psychological and strategic catastrophe, did not over task or challenge the ability 
of the federal government to provide support to local authorities in New York,  
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Virginia and Pennsylvania, which responded to their aftermath. However, the 
attacks resulted in the creation of a domestic system that replicated the 
interagency framework of the national security system.  
B. THE 9/11 EFFECT  
In October 2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13228 creating 
the Homeland Security Council (HSC), which was followed by HSPD-1 to 
establish the structure and process of the homeland interagency system. The 
2002 Homeland Security Act codified the HSC, created the Department of 
Homeland Security, and integrated FEMA as a sub-component of the 
Department (U.S. Congress, 2002). Consequently, in just over a year, the federal 
government managed to replicate a model born out of the experiences of a world 
war, had several decades of evolution during the Cold War, and was showing 
signs of strain after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The directives and legislation 
assigned coordination responsibilities respectively for federal homeland security 
activities to both the HSC and the DHS Secretary.17 In short order, both the HSC 
and the DHS developed a number policies, strategies and plans almost 
exclusively focused on terrorism and sought to provide a fix to the major 
intelligence and information sharing failures experienced during the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. Nowhere is this approach more evident than in the 2002 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security where the emergency preparedness and 
response paradigm was shifted to the assumption that preparing for a 
catastrophic terrorist attack would also result in adequate preparation for natural 
disasters (U.S. Executive Office of the President, 2002). While the focus 
remained on the terrorist threat, the Bush Administration did not take any 
significant measures to ensure that federal emergency planning for catastrophes 
was coordinated and synchronized to the degree that they were seeking in 
counter-terrorism activities. In a parallel resembling President Carter’s Executive 
Order 12148, Bush’s 2003 HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 vested the Secretary of DHS 
                                            
17 Homeland Security Act to both, HSPD-1 to the HSC, 
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with the responsibilities to coordinate federal response and preparedness 
activities but did not weighed the department to lead what was becoming a 
complex multi-agency effort effectively. Vesting refers to the assignment of 
responsibility. Weighing refers to the conferral of power – in this case the power 
to direct other organizations during the pre- and post disaster time frames 
(Miskel, 2006, p. 68). Their uncanny similarity goes as far as to assume voluntary 
agency cooperation and compliance by including a mandate directing all 
departments to cooperate.18 The Federal Response Plan was updated and 
published as the National Response Plan (NRP) in 2004, but essentially, it 
preserved the system in place since the early 1990s; plans were developed in 
stovepipes with no structure that ensured vertical and horizontal integration (U.S. 
Executive Office of the President, 2006, p. 66). Therefore, the stage was set for a 
test that would strain and challenge the capabilities of the federal government on 
a scale never experienced before. Hurricane Katrina would become the Super 
Bowl of preparedness and response; it propelled the asymmetries of the 21st 
century into a collision course with traditional federalism and the canon that 
massive capabilities could compensate for multi-dimensional integration.  
C. KATRINA 
In the early morning hours of August 29, 2005, when Hurricane Katrina 
made landfall in the Gulf Coast, the nation was counting on this system to deliver 
a coordinated and synchronized federal response. The magnitude and scale of 
Hurricane Katrina, a bonafide national catastrophe, was the first real test since 
Hurricane Andrew that placed a significant strain and challenge on the federal 
preparedness and response system. The federal government threw in the 
proverbial kitchen sink into the response efforts but the outcome was predictable 
since there was no accountability for the development of federal agency  
 
 
                                            
18 See Bush’s HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, and Carter’s EO12148. 
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operational plans, no visibility over available capabilities, and more importantly, a 
structure to synchronize available agency plans even if they existed. The 
Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report explains it best:  
At the most fundamental level, part of the explanation for why the 
response to Katrina did not go as planned is that key decision-
makers at all levels simply were not familiar with the plans. The 
NRP was relatively new to many at the Federal, State, and local 
levels before the events of Hurricane Katrina. This lack of 
understanding of the “National” plan not surprisingly resulted in 
ineffective coordination of the Federal, State, and local response. 
Additionally, the NRP itself provides only the ‘base plan’ outlining 
the overall elements of a response: Federal departments and 
agencies were required to develop supporting operational plans 
and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to integrate their 
activities into the national response. In almost all cases, the 
integrating SOPs were either non-existent or still under 
development when Hurricane Katrina hit. Consequently, some of 
the specific procedures and processes of the NRP were not 
properly implemented, and Federal partners had to operate without 
any prescribed guidelines or chains of command. (U.S. Executive 
Office of the President, 2006, p. 53) 
Hurricane Katrina proved beyond doubt that if the business as usual 
approach for preparedness, specifically, the development, coordination and 
synchronization of plans, was not adequate to respond to a large-scale natural 
disaster, it would be even less effective for a national catastrophe resulting from 
terrorist attacks. Congress responded by passing the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act in 2006. This statute addressed DHS and FEMA 
response issues, but more importantly, it established a legislative mandate for 
national preparedness. It directed the federal government to develop a National 
Preparedness System, National Preparedness Goals, National Planning 
Scenarios, and mandated the development of deliberate operational plans by 
federal agencies. The Bush Administration followed suit by publishing National 
Preparedness Guidelines (September 2007), a new National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (October 2007), Annex 1 to HSPD 8 (December 2007), a 
National Response Framework (January 2008) and the Integrated Planning 
System (January 2009). These seminal documents established a framework and 
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process for the development of federal plans in use today. As a result, it was the 
Hurricane Katrina catastrophe that propelled the first significant changes to a 
preparedness system decades old, had several close calls and failed, and finally, 
proved totally inadequate when seriously challenged. These changes, although 
not perfect, were a step forward, since for the first time in history, the federal 
government had a system in place to coordinate domestic interagency planning 
efforts. The system mimicked the national security system processes at the 
strategic level but left intact the operational autonomy of the federal departments.  
D. NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND PLANNING 
The national security system provides a formal structure at the strategic 
level that serves as a forum for strategic level coordination and synchronization. 
Since 9/11, the system evolved to include the homeland as part of its 
responsibilities for strategic direction. The Bush Administration copied the NSC 
model when it established its domestic twin, the Homeland Security Council. 
President Obama, in his first month in office, signed two directives that had direct 
consequences on the federal planning system. His PDD-1 maintained the 
traditional NSC model by preserving the Principals (PC), Deputies (DC) and 
Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) structure and interagency process (Obama, 
2009). These senior level groups provide the direction that aligns the federal 
departments with the national objectives and ensure that they comply with the 
President’s agenda. However, in Presidential Study Directive One (PSD-1), he 
signaled a shift by stating that homeland security is indistinguishable from 
national security–conceptually and functionally; they should be thought of 
together rather than separately (Obama, 2009). This led to the merger of the 
NSC and HSC staffs and a major effort to review the national preparedness 
system.  
Even under the potential revisions of the Obama Administration HSPD-8, 
the system’s structure of PCs, DCs and IPCs continues to provide oversight over 
the international and domestic policy and strategy efforts, and just as it has been 
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since Hurricane Katrina, their function includes oversight over operational 
planning in the homeland.19 It is important to note that the members of the 
Principals and Deputies Committees are the department heads and deputies, 
respectively.20 Currently, there are approximately 11 IPCs for foreign regions, 27 
for functional areas and seven focused on homeland security areas (Whittaker, 
Smith, & McKune, 2008, p. 15).21 All these IPCs, with their multiple functional 
areas, report to DCs and PCs, which is the forum in which policy issues are 
resolved or approved. To put this in perspective, the schedule of these DCs and 
PCs is driven by national strategic priorities based on: a) real world events (Haiti, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, etc.); b) presidential priorities (summits, 
trips, head of state visits, country or region specific issues, etc.); and c) programs 
(treaties, strategies, QDR, QHSR, plans, etc).22 Although the numerous IPCs can 
meet as often as necessary, the DC and PC schedule is limited by real world 
priorities where planning may not be on the top of the list. Making matters worse, 
the NSC/HSC staffs are relatively small and getting the issues ready for prime 
time before the principals or deputies takes time. The end result is a bottleneck at 
the White House that constitutes a bureaucratic impediment, that in the end, 
places the principals and deputies in the reactive mode looking at crises rather 
than focusing on policy, guidance and strategy (Project for National Security 
Reform, 2008, p. 330, 389).  
The Domestic Readiness Group (DRG) is the IPC convened on a regular 
basis to develop and coordinate preparedness, response, and incident 
management policy, and as such, it is also responsible for oversight over 
development of homeland security strategic guidance, strategies and concept 
plans within the structure of the Integrated Planning System, National Response 
Framework and National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG) (U.S. Department of 
                                            
19 IPS states that coordination will be done by the HSPD-1 process, pp. 4–5. 
20 Designated representatives are permitted in their absence. 
21 Obama Administration is reviewing the list but it is not available to the public. 
22 Source: author. Analysis of the NSC/HSC schedule for the last two years. The number of 
meetings average about 2x-3x daily. 
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Homeland Security, 2008, p. 54). The DRG straddles between the strategic and 
operational domains. At the strategic level, the DRG is the forum in which 
homeland security strategic guidance statements (SGS) and strategies are 
reviewed, de-conflicted and approved before they go up to a DC and PC for 
approval. Conversely, at the operational level, the DRG does the same thing for 
federal concept plans (CONPLAN), and also may be convened during an incident 
by DHS to evaluate relevant interagency policy issues regarding response and 
develop recommendations as may be required (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008, p. 54).  
While the collective federal government strategic and operational 
preparedness framework is fully coordinated and synchronized under the 
interagency process, individual agency operational plans remain on autopilot just 
like they have been since the Three Mile Island Disaster. As discussed in the 
literature review, there is an ongoing vigorous debate about whether strategic 
planning is effective, can be improved or has to be reinvented. While, that may 
be the case, the fact remains that the failures of Katrina, and for that matter 
Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, were not strategic in nature. At the most basic 
level, it was the over reliance on federal departments’ voluntary compliance with 
the established preparedness framework and a reluctance to establish a system 
able to track, coordinate and synchronize agency operational plans. This was the 
Katrina blind spot; no one in the federal government, including DHS and FEMA, 
could reasonably visualize how the multiple federal agencies were supposed to 
integrate their plans, capabilities and timing efforts magically into a fully 
coordinated and synchronized federal response. This horizontal coordination and 
synchronization blind spot remains today since the IPS does not prescribe a 
process and the interagency system has not been able to force the function 
under its current governance framework.  
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E. THE FEDERAL PLANNING PROCESS 
The purpose of the Integrated Planning System (IPS) is to further enhance 
the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard and 
comprehensive approach to national planning (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009, p. iii). Annex I of HSPD-8 envisioned the IPS as a structure that 
would “translate policies, strategies and planning guidance” into a family of 
strategic, operational and tactical plans and established a timeline for their 
development. Figure 1 defines the type of plans and describes the relationship 
between the family of plans and the strategic, operational and tactical domains.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Federal Family of Plans 
The National Planning Scenarios were the first major effort under IPS to 
focus the development of federal plans to respond to national level 
catastrophes.23 They are required by legislation and presidential directive to 
                                            
23 Established as a key element of the National Preparedness Guidelines, NPG, p. iii. 
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establish a planning and preparedness baseline for worst-case catastrophes. 
According to the IPS, the Secretary of Homeland Security was tasked by the 
President to work in coordination with other agencies with a role in homeland 
security to develop a Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS), Strategic Plan, and a 
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) for each NPS (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2009, p. IV).  
DHS, per HSPD-8, took the lead for the development of strategic level 
documents by forming the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT).24 This 
Interagency group housed in DHS at the Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning is responsible for collaboratively developing Strategic Planning 
Guidance and Strategic Plans for each of the 15 scenarios and submitting them 
to the Domestic Readiness Group for review, concurrence, and if required, 
adjudication of issues. The IMPT has faced significant obstacles in gaining intra-
agency and interagency cooperation in their efforts to produce these plans. Their 
efficiency was affected because some of the interagency members were not 
empowered to make decisions by parent agencies, and in some cases, 
personnel assigned were not as capable as the planning process required 
(Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 49). Nevertheless, once the IMPT products are 
cleared by the DRG, the documents are reviewed using the NSC process 
described above and any remaining conflicts adjudicated at the DC or PC level 
as appropriate. Once that process is complete, the Secretary of DHS signs the 
document and distributes it to the federal departments and the homeland security 
community. HSPD-8 Annex 1 directs the development of a CONPLAN no later 
than 180 days after the Secretary of DHS issues a strategic plan for any of the 
National Planning Scenarios (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  
The IMPT at DHS does not develop CONPLANS; they are the product of 
the FEMA Operational Planning Branch of the Disaster Operations Directorate. 
This is a result of the Post-Katrina Act, which essentially made FEMA the lead for 
                                            
24 The IMPT is also the proponent of the National Planners Course, which seeks to train 
federal and non-federal stakeholders in the development of plans. 
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coordinating the federal government operational planning (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 100). Unlike DHS, which uses an interagency work 
group to develop plans, FEMA uses their internal planers to develop the 
CONPLANs and holds stakeholder meetings to seek their input and comments.25 
Once these plans are developed, they go through the same process as the 
Strategic Guidance and Plans with the exception that the DRG provides the final 
NSC level review before the Secretary’s signature.26 Agencies with homeland 
security responsibilities have 120 days after its signature to develop their 
operational plans. According to the Interagency Sharing of Federal Department 
and Agency Integrated Planning System (IPS) Related Plans Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP), agencies should forward their operational plans through the 
DRG for posting into the homeland security information network. This document 
also establishes the expectation that individual agencies review all posted 
agency IPS related plans to identify best practices, seams, gaps or overlaps for 
inclusion into a work group review process. While in theory this system for 
synchronization is available, just like its previous predecessors, it relies on 
voluntary compliance by all federal departments. Unfortunately, federal agencies 
historically do not have a great track record of compliance with policy and 
processes. The Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report, Interagency 
Cooperation Case studies and various GAO reports attest to that.27  
As indicated previously, the Obama Administration has signaled that it 
intends to undertake a major review of the IPS and HSPD-8. Their aim is to 
establish a fully integrated National Planning System that incorporates an end-to-
end process that links policy, strategy, plans, capabilities and budget as a system 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 72). It is unclear if the initiative 
will result in the modification of the IPS family of plans and the National Planning 
                                            
25 A good number of them are contractors, FEMA Operations Branch Contact Roster. 
26 FEMA CONPLAN Leadership Status Brief, March 2009. Major IA disputes are resolve at 
the DC or PC level as appropriate. 
27 See PNSR.org for case studies that highlighted this problem. 
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Scenarios. However, what is clear is that federal agencies are required to 
develop their own operational plans, which creates a need for coordination and 
synchronization. It is on this basis that the performance of the system should be 
evaluated since every major disaster has consistently exposed a lack of 
harmonization of the federal response effort. 
F. DELIVERING THE GOODS  
Clearly, since Hurricane Katrina, the federal government established a 
domestic emergency planning architecture that, in a sense, is more complex than 
ever before in history; but the question is does the system performs as 
designed? It is a known fact that the United States has enormous capabilities to 
respond to reoccurring disasters and has been fairly successful in these cases. 
However, that does not guarantee that the system can work as designed for 
large scale or multiple catastrophes, since as history has shown, they tend to 
strain the ability of the system to perform. As already demonstrated, the federal 
governance structure places high emphasis on planning, coordination and 
synchronization. It is almost near impossible to find a document in the federal 
system that does not stress the importance of these three functions. Moreover, 
these functions are the center of gravity of a system focused around the 
catastrophic scenarios listed in the NRF. These scenarios represent examples of 
the gravest dangers facing the United States and have been accorded the 
highest priority for federal planning (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2008, p. 73). In this sense, a catastrophe is defined as an incident or multiple 
incidents that embody the greatest risk of mass casualties, massive property 
loss, and immense social disruption whose cascading effects expose 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited and erode the citizens’ confidence on the 
Nation’s government (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 3).28 In 
other words, these nightmare scenarios can bring the nation to its knees.  
 
                                            
28 Post Katrina Act defines catastrophe in similar terms in GAO-08-868T on page 2. 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that the architecture contains parameters for the 
development of strategic and operational documents that can be used to analyze 
the performance of the system.  
These parameters can be analyzed in terms of outcomes, efficiency, 
alignment and effectiveness. The outcomes measure the number and the type of 
plans that the system produces against established requirements (Project for 
National Security Reform, 2008, p. 85). Efficiency evaluates whether the system 
outcomes meet the established requirements in timelines and integration by 
establishing a management system that sets appropriate objectives and 
milestones, leverages production resources, and compensates for outside 
variables for the development of plans (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2009, p. 33). Alignment uses a sampling of available plans to determine whether 
they are consistent with policy objectives and strategy. Lastly, effectiveness 
evaluates the system to assess whether it contains a synchronization process 
that drives vertical and horizontal integration (U.S. Department of Homeland 




Figure 2.   Scenario Sets (From NRF p. 75) 
Outcomes. The requirement to conduct scenario driven planning was 
established by legislation and presidential directives.29 HSPD-8 Annex 1 
established the requirement for the development of a family of plans using the 
IPS and was based on the 15 catastrophic scenarios in the NRF. These 
scenarios were grouped in eight categories as depicted in Figure 2 (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 75).  
The directive requires the federal government as an entity to produce one 
each strategic guidance statement, strategic plan and concept plan. The federal 
departments, in turn, are required to produce at least one operational plan for 
each of CONPLAN addressing a particular scenario category.  
  
                                            
29 Post Katrina Act and HSPD-8 Annex 1.  
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Table 1.   IPS Plan Status (After IMPT Newsletter; data from GAO) 
While the number of plans required from the government as an entity are 
fairly easy to determine (one each strategic guidance statement, strategic plan 
and concept plan per set), the same cannot be said about agency operational 
plans because the IPS lists 31 federal agencies, that depending on their role and 
mission in each scenario set, may be required to develop operational plans (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 3–3). Table 1 provides a status as 
of January 13, 2010 for each of the national planning scenario sets. The table 
indicates that, at the strategic level, some significant progress has been made in 
the development of strategic guidance and strategic plans. Conversely, progress 
at the operational level has been minimal since the federal government has only 
produced one CONPLAN with another plan on the pipeline under final review. 
However, more telling, is the last column, which addresses the status of 
individual agency operational plans (OPLAN) that indicate that none has been 
completed to date. This status has not changed at all since GAO conducted their 
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comprehensive review of preparedness plans in April 2009 (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 100). This finding was repeated in October 2009 
during their evaluation of DoD’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and 
High-Explosive (CBRNE) plans when GAO found that the department was not 
able to integrate these plans with other federal agencies because their plans 
were not completed (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009, p. 3).  
Before assessing whether the system is producing the required outcomes, 
it is significant to consider the effect on variables on plan production. These 
variables include agency planning capabilities and shifting national priorities. 
Although HSPD-8 directs all federal agencies with homeland security 
responsibility to develop planning capabilities, no system is in place from which 
to assess the level of progress in this area (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 
48).30 This data is essential for the development of a program management 
system that can adequately track and resource planning efforts. Therefore, 
without this data, the assumption is made at the federal level that the 
departments have complied with the requirement and are capable of producing 
plans in accordance with the established guidelines.  
The other variables deal with shifting operational priorities like the H1N1 
pandemic and southwest border violence planning, which had an effect on 
production as they sidetracked the IMPT from deliberate planning to crisis action 
planning. A change in priorities at the HSC led to the development of a family of 
plans for these events as established by the IPS.31 Lastly, on September 2009, 
the administration placed a moratorium on National Planning Scenario planning 
while it reviewed HSPD-8 and the IPS. In the same month, the DRG approved 
resuming review of the IND CONPLAN, which as of this writing, is still  
 
 
                                            
30 See also Heritage Foundation, National Disaster Planning Slowed by Inadequate 
Interagency Process, October 24, 2007. 
31 Author’s conversation with IMPT members. 
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undergoing review. Regardless, the analysis suggests that at the strategic level, 
the IMPT and the DRG have achieved some success developing the required 
plans as indicated by Table 1.  
The system has completed 56% of the strategic level plans required by 
the IPS. At the operational level, only one 12% of the CONPLANs has been 
completed (1 out of 8). This is not factoring in the requirement for the 
development of agency operational plans, which as Table 1 indicates, has a 0% 
completion rate.32 Based on this assessment, the current system’s performance 
at the strategic level shows progress under current conditions but is not optimal. 
As discussed previously, the literature is abundant with recommendations to 
improve or reinvent the strategic system, which is not the case at the operational 
level, since most of the literature takes a unitary view of the strategic and 
operational domains. As this assessment demonstrates, a substantial difference 
in outcomes exists between the strategic and operational level. Both Congress 
and the CRS have voiced concerns over the lack of operational plans as they 
recognize that these plans are essential for the government’s execution of the 
NRF during a major catastrophic incident (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 
2008, p. CRS-9). This supports the conclusion that the system is not performing 
as designed at the operational level.  
Efficiency. The Post Katrina Act and HSPD-8 established the requirement 
for the management of federal preparedness. At the strategic level, both the 
statute and the directive place that responsibility on the Secretary of DHS in 
coordination with the federal departments that have homeland security 
responsibility. HSPD-8 Annex 1 also tasked the Secretary of DHS to develop a 
National Homeland Security Plan (NHSP) intended to “facilitate federal homeland 
security coordination, establish priorities and define roles and responsibilities” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). This plan would have 
                                            
32 GAO used FEMA and DHS operational plan requirements to determine how many 
operational plans were completed in their 09-369 report. Based on this, they assessed that 16 
agency operational plans were not completed. 
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established the structure for the implementation of the Homeland Security 
Management System required by the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security. DHS published a pre-decisional draft of the plan on 2008, but all work 
on the document was stopped because of the administration’s review of the 
federal planning system. Therefore, the cornerstone of the management system 
is not in place.  
Conversely, at the operational level, the Post Katrina statute specifically 
tasks FEMA to develop a “comprehensive system to assess, on an ongoing 
basis, the nation’s prevention capabilities and overall preparedness, including 
operational readiness. The assessment system must assess (i) compliance with 
the national preparedness system, National Incident Management System, 
National Response Plan (now known as the National Response Framework), and 
other related plans and strategies…” (U.S. Congress, 2006).33 The act’s 
mandate addressed a major finding from the Katrina Lessons Learned, where it 
was noted that that federal departments and agencies, were required to develop 
supporting operational plans and standard operating procedures for national 
response activities. However, in almost all cases, these required plans and 
procedures were either nonexistent or still under development (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 29)34 In essence, statute required FEMA to 
develop a program management plan to shepherd the federal operational 
planning efforts.  
According to GAO, a program management plan would have helped 
FEMA identify the specific schedule of activities that needed to be performed to 
complete and identify dependencies among policy and planning development 
activities; identify the types and quantities of resources required to perform, and 
amount of time needed to complete, all policy and planning development 
activities; analyze activity sequences, durations, resource requirements, and 
schedule constraints to create and update the policy and planning project 
                                            
33 See Section 749, also in GAO 09-369 p. 53. 
34 Also found in Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report and CRS NRF report. 
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schedules; and control for changes to the project schedules precipitated by 
outside forces. This finding resonates throughout the literature where a 
reoccurring conclusion is that the national security system, both domestically and 
international, does not have efficient planning processes.35 Thus, the absence of 
a management system at the strategic level and the failure of FEMA to use best 
practices for program management suggest that the system is not efficient. In 
terms of meeting the established requirements, the outcomes of the system have 
not been timely or fully integrated.36  
The IMPT interagency construct established by DHS has been able, with 
some success, to keep the production of strategic level plans a reasonable rate. 
However, their dual responsibility for contingency (deliberate) and crisis action 
planning is a double edge sword that affects their efficiency when national 
priorities or events required a focus on crisis action planning (Project for National 
Security Reform, 2008, p. A6–667). On the other hand, FEMA has not shown 
significant progress in its responsibility to drive federal operational planning 
efforts. While GAO ascribed this shortcoming to the absence of a program 
management system, it needs to be taken in the context that GAO has 
traditionally supported the “lead agency” concept, which historically has proven 
inadequate in many cases (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 17). Clearly, the 
absence of operational plans is not surprising nor headline breaking news. Since 
the Three Mile Island disaster, this finding has consistently been repeated in 
every major post-mortem of a federal disaster failure.  
Alignment. It is important to note that whether these policies and 
strategies are right for the nation, it is not within the scope of this thesis. That 
point is the subject of a national debate and the numerous proposals to overhaul 
the national security system.37 The alignment assessment is an examination of 
                                            
35 PNSR and CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Reports. 
36 GAO and CRS commented on the lack of integration with non-federal jurisdictions. 
Thomas Birkland and Sarah Waterman make a similar claim on their essay “Is Federalism the 
Reason for Policy Failure in Hurricane Katrina.” 
37 PNSR, BG-N, etc. 
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the number of plans available and whether they are aligned with policy and grand 
strategy.38 As noted on Table 1, a very limited number of plans are available; 
more so at the strategic level than at the operational level. As previously 
discussed, the national security system provides a mechanism to ensure the 
alignment of plans with national policy and their coordination among the federal 
agencies. All indications are that the IMPT has used the IPS process to develop, 
coordinate and seek approval of strategic level plans. The DRG was chartered to 
review all strategic level plans to ensure compliance with the IPS and alignment 
with the Administration’s policy objectives. The Deputies Committee, and if 
appropriate, the Principals Committee, provided a senior level review and 
granted approval for those strategic level plans listed in Table 1. GAO reviewed 
approved and in progress plans as part of their assessment on national 
preparedness and cross-walked them with the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, HSPD-5, HSPD-8 and various other policy directives (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, pp. 76–78). Their findings did not indicate any 
discrepancies in the alignment and quality of these plans concerning established 
policies and processes (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009, pp. 9–
13).39 
At the operational level, the system has produced a total of three 
CONPLANs that have gone through the IPS process from cradle to grave: the 
Terrorist Use of Explosives, the Period of Heightened Alert and the Federal 
Interagency Hurricane.40 HSPD-8 Annex 1 directed the development of the 
Terrorist Use of Explosives CONPLAN. Conversely, the HSC directed the Period 
of Heightened Alert and Hurricane CONPLANS in response to national priorities. 
These documents received an interagency qualitative review per the IPS process 
and their format and structure are identical to the one prescribed in Appendix C 
                                            
38 Presidential Policy Directives establish policy. The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security and other strategies (National Maritime Security Strategy, National Infrastructure 
Protection Strategy, etc.) drive the grand strategy. 
39 A separate review by the author of all the published and draft plans confirmed this finding. 
40 TUE, April 2009, POHA, January 2009, and Hurricane, May 2009. 
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of the IPS.41 Clearly, the system works for federal level operational plans, which 
imposes an interagency qualitative review using the national security system 
before the Secretary of DHS signs and publishes the document (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 5-11/5-12). However, that is not the 
case for the required agency operational plans. As the GAO findings indicate, 
FEMA has not developed a program management system to track the 
development of agency operational plans required by law and policy. While this 
may be a useful tool, it is doubtful that FEMA can muster the power or authorities 
to compel compliance with this system by other federal agencies. The DRG 
attempted to compensate for this shortcoming by publishing an interagency SOP 
in which agencies agreed to submit their plans through the DRG for posting into 
the HSIN portal.42 To date, no record or evidence of any agency plan using this 
process exists; indicating that while this process exists on paper, it has not 
materialized into the desired system that can collaboratively assess alignment 
and compliance among the federal department’s operational plans. Interestingly, 
DHS reported to Congress in January that it had mostly complied with the Post-
Katrina Act and had implemented most of the Lessons Learned 
recommendations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). As already 
seen, GAO’s April 2009 findings seem to contradict that assessment.  
Effectiveness. The National Strategy for Homeland Security sought to 
establish “a deliberate and dynamic system that translates our policies, 
strategies, doctrine, and planning guidance into a family of strategic, operational, 
and tactical plans. These plans should be coordinated with relevant stakeholders, 
consistent with the fundamental roles and responsibilities of local, tribal, state, 
and federal governments bring to bear all appropriate instruments of national 
power and influence, assign activities to specific homeland security actors, and 
appropriately sequence these activities against a timeline for implementation” 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 43). This strategic objective is 
                                            
41 See IPS, p. C-1.  
42 DRG IA Plan Sharing SOP. 
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based on legislation, which requires that plans be coordinated under a unified 
system and with the participation of non-federal jurisdictions (U.S. Congress, 
2006).43 HSPD-8 Annex-1 states that developing a synchronized and 
coordinated planning capability at all levels of the government is of paramount 
national importance (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). These 
requirements in law, policy, and strategy guided the development of the national 
planning governance structure in the post Katrina era. The National Planning 
Guidelines, the National Response Framework, and ultimately, the Integrated 
Planning System, refer to this conceptual framework that establishes the 
desirability for vertical and horizontal integration of plans between stakeholders. 
It is a “desire” instead of a requirement because the federal government lacks the 
constitutional authority to mandate integration among the many stakeholders that 
comprise the response community.  
 
Figure 3.   GAO Stakeholder Analysis 
                                            
43 See Section 653. 
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It is on this premise that the IPS bases the effectiveness of the planning 
system. In its own words, “the IPS has been developed recognizing that 
homeland security planning is based on coordination and synchronization rather 
than command and control. In the Executive Branch, only the President of the 
United States has directive authority over federal departments and agencies. 
Effective planning in this situation can only occur through federal departments 
and agencies actively coordinating and synchronizing their planning with each, 
as required by the situation.” Hence, this statement establishes the grounds for 
evaluating the planning system.  
As established in the previous sections, the HSPD-1 and the IPS 
established a formal process to coordinate federal level plans horizontally. As 
previously stated, this process works for the Strategic Guidance Statements, 
Strategic Plans and the federal CONPLANs that have been approved. These 
plans, as shown in Figure 1, establish how the federal government responds to 
an incident. The CONPLAN provides the concept for coordinating and 
synchronizing federal capabilities as an entity but does not specifically address 
the availability, deployment and employment of capabilities. For example, in the 
Federal Interagency Hurricane Concept Plan, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
is responsible for four tasks: provide support to DHS, provide Defense 
Coordination Officers, conduct immediate support under Mutual Aid Agreements 
and provide Corp of Engineers support (Federal Interagency Hurricane 
CONPLAN, p. 19). Obviously, these tasks are not capabilities but the CONPLAN 
provides the context of what is expected from the DoD, which provides the basis 
for the development of the required agency OPLAN. The DoD has already 
identified over 60 capabilities it can provide or make available for response 
operations in the homeland, but this level of detail and capabilities can only be 
found in the supporting OPLAN.44 Similarly, other agencies are given 
responsibilities and the expectation is that they identify the capabilities they are 
                                            
44 Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
American Security Affairs Memorandum Subject: Determination of Department of Defense Civil 
Support Requirements, July 13, 2009. 
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to provide to support the federal concept of operations in their agency OPLAN. 
Since no structure or process exists to coordinate and synchronize what can be 
up to 31 OPLANs for a national catastrophe, no way exists that DHS, as the lead 
coordinator, can determine who is bringing what, when is it coming and how it is 
going to be used.  
At the operational level, the effectiveness of plans is predicated on the 
synchronization of timing, space and purpose (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2009, pp. 1–7). The IPS makes three assumptions in this regard: a) 
agencies have developed the planning capabilities implied in HSPD-8, b) 
agencies develop operational plans as specified in the system, and c) agencies 
coordinate and synchronize these plans with all the stakeholders. Regardless of 
all the good will and professionalism that has to be assumed, the fact remains 
that voluntary compliance without appropriate oversight and measurement 
processes has not worked historically in the federal system. Rather than 
repeating the findings from every catastrophe since Three Mile Island to illustrate 
this point, a more recent example is available in the legislative and policy 
mandate for federal agencies to adopt and implement the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).45 The January 09 Federal Preparedness report 
indicated that only 30% of all agencies reported 100% compliance with the NIMS 
even though the system is a pillar of the federal response system and a national 
priority (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 20). To put this in 
perspective, the report highlights that over 96% of the states have achieved 
NIMS implementation. In the case of the states, the requirement is tied to the 
system of grant funding, but at the federal level, the system completely relies on 
voluntary compliance. The Federal Response Plan and the National Response 
Plan were built on the same three assumptions as the IPS, and as seen 
previously, when a large-scale catastrophe struck, these systems failed. 
                                            
45 Directed by Post Katrina Act Sect 653 and HSPD-5. 
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The assumption that federal agencies will appropriately coordinate and 
synchronize their plans with all the stakeholders, specifically with non-federal 
jurisdictions and the private sector, is worth further analysis since it is one of the 
tenants of current legislation and policy.46 At the strategic level, the involvement 
of non-federal jurisdictions and the private sector in the planning process has 
been inconsistent because the governance framework did not establish a formal 
system for their inclusion in the policy and planning development process. 
Despite seven years of effort since 9/11, no mechanism currently exists to 
integrate mutually reinforcing comprehensive plans at the local, state and federal 
levels into a credible national response plan (Project for National Security 
Reform, 2008, p. 42). The Center for Strategic Studies confirms this finding and 
argues that a healthy consultative planning process is also essential in creating 
the relationships and building the trust and credibility between federal, state, and 
local officials that are necessary if the nation is to respond effectively to a 
catastrophe (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 52).47  
The Private Sector and NGOs are not fairing much better than non-federal 
jurisdictions. This is, in fact, the unexplored frontier since the potential 
capabilities that they can contribute in response to a catastrophe are enormous 
as well. The private sector owns most of the nation’s critical infrastructure and 
can be most effective in restoring its functions after an incident, which strongly 
suggests that they should be fully integrated into the system (Defense Science 
Board, 2009, p. 38). Equally important, the NGOs bring substantial surge 
capabilities that should require integration into the planning process. Just like 
their private sector counterparts, they are not consistently integrated into the 
government efforts (Homeland Security Institute, 2006, p. 23). The IMPT and 
FEMA have involved the American Red Cross during the development of some 
                                            
46 Non-federal jurisdiction refers to state, local and tribal governments; Private Sector 
includes businesses and their organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizen 
organizations.  
47 Author’s emphasis on effective. 
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federal level plans since it has a NRF support function.48 However, this 
arrangement does not incorporate the rest of the NGO community, which has 
substantial capabilities as well (Homeland Security Institute, 2006, p. 23). In all 
fairness, besides the absence of a formal structure to integrate NGOs into the 
planning system, a lack of funding also precludes them from dedicating planning 
staffs to support the federal planning efforts (Government Accountability Office, 
2008, p. 63). 
DHS established a Homeland Security Advisory Council and a Private 
Sector Office to ensure the equities of non-federal stakeholders are heard in the 
department (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). However, their 
effectiveness is questionable as the findings from the CSIS study indicate that 
officials from state and local governments have complained consistently and 
repeatedly that they are disconnected from the policy development process in 
Washington (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 52). Similar feedback has been 
reported by the private sector and NGOs (Defense Science Board, 2009, p. 38). 
Many indicate that although consultative and advisory boards are in place, 
consultations typically involve only a select few—the “usual suspects”—who are 
perceived, fairly or unfairly, as having been co-opted by federal officials 
(Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 52). This data suggest that a dichotomy exists 
in the federal planning system. On one hand, a formal planning system that 
integrates federal stakeholders at the strategic level exists but it relies on 
informal structures to integrate non-federal stakeholders. On the other hand, 
operational planning uses the same framework for the development of 
CONPLANs, but for agency operational plans, the system relies on ad hoc 
processes and voluntary compliance to integrate federal and non-federal 
stakeholders. This leads to the conclusion that the system is partially effective for 
federal level plans since it contains the structure and processes to integrate at 
least federal stakeholders. However, it is not the case for agency level 
operational plans because the system has not changed for decades. Namely , 
                                            
48 NRF lists the Red Cross as supporting ESF-6 Mass Care.  
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the system is built on the assumption that agencies can, on their own 
recognizance, develop the required capabilities, synchronize their efforts and 
comply with established processes. Obviously, the system’s formal integration of 
non-federal stakeholders is lacking at all levels. This gap is driving the Obama 
Administration to develop a multi-jurisdictional and multi-sector National Planning 
System (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 72).  
G. ANALYSIS 
This chapter provided a history of federal domestic interagency planning 
system and described its structure. The history shows a consistent pattern on the 
government’s approach for emergency preparedness that exists even today. The 
federal government operates on the premise that governance frameworks can 
translate to coordinated and synchronized action. That was the case with the first 
Federal Response Plan, which failed during Hurricane Andrew, the National 
Response Plan, which failed during Hurricane Katrina and could be the case for 
the yet to be tested National Response Framework. The ability to respond to a 
disaster effectively is not in question since historically, although in some cases 
not pretty, the overwhelming capabilities of the federal government can work 
through a lack of coordination and synchronization problems. The issue is not if, 
but when the United States experiences the next catastrophe Super Bowl, will 
the system be able to perform or will it fail again. A strong consensus exists 
among the community of national security experts that indicate pessimism about 
the prospects of the system to handle large scale and/or multiple catastrophes: 
the country is still not ready for a domestic catastrophe because the 
major relationships and processes needed to coordinate a 
response to a catastrophic event are not yet clear or mature and 
because attempts to date to implement a homeland security system 
that will organize these relationships and processes have struggled 
mightily. (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 3) 
Strengths. The analysis suggests that significant strengths exists in the 
system. At the strategic level, the formal interagency structure to develop, review 
and approve policies, guidance and plans give a forum to all federal agencies to 
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voice their concerns regardless of their size or importance. It also provides a 
venue for interagency plans to be elevated to the highest level of the government 
and receive appropriate visibility. Although not perfect, the system also transfers 
knowledge among the departments. The evidence was found on the planning 
system framework, which was adapted from the Department of Defense 
extensive planning doctrine and experience. The IPS copied the format of the 
five-paragraph field order as the core structure for the development of plans. The 
system is also adaptable to shifting priorities as demonstrated by its ability to 
produce the H1N1, Hurricane and POHA family of plans. Even while operating 
under the Founding Father’s harmoniously dysfunctional design, the federal 
departments have been able to develop and field collectively an impressive array 
of capabilities well matched for reoccurring disasters.49 Lastly, there is the double 
edge sword of departmental autonomy, which by itself is a strength, but leads to 
the collective system weakness. It is a strength because it serves to focus the 
agency planning efforts and resources towards the mission areas and priorities 
established by the department leadership. Conversely, it is also the cause, as 
seen previously, of the inability of the government as a whole to establish 
structures and processes to make the planning system more effective.  
Weaknesses. The system over-relies on governance and ad hoc 
arrangements without the formal processes or structures to ensure compliance 
and to measure progress towards established objectives reasonably. The 
responsibility for coordinating federal planning is divided between DHS at the 
strategic level and FEMA at the operational level. This structural divide creates a 
physical barrier between the operational and strategic planning process that adds 
another level of coordination since both organizations have to find ways to 
integrate their efforts. As seen previously, both DHS and FEMA are the leads for 
their respective planning levels, but this lead responsibility did not come with 
authorities. In the case of the DHS, IMPT it is not as critical since it is responsible 
                                            
49 i.e., RFID, Sensor Networks, Biometrics, Radiation Detection, Chemical Detection, Bio 
Detection, UAVs, CCTV, Satellite Imagery and GIS. 
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for developing a collective federal product. FEMA, on the other hand, is 
responsible for coordinating the development of agency operational plans, which 
as GAO findings indicated, progress has been dismal. Never mind that the “Lead 
Agency” approach has not been historically successful; both agencies, when 
faced with lack of cooperation or interagency conflicts, have no other recourse 
than to use the national security system for resolution (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 
2008, p. 17). However, this by itself is a daunting task that places deliberate 
planning in competition against short-term policy issues that require immediate 
attention in a system already stretched thin by national and international 
challenges (Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 274). Although the 
system can respond and has responded to shifting national priorities, the 
consequences are that deliberate planning takes the back seat to any front 
burner issue since the planners at both the DHS IMPT and the FEMA Operations 
Planning Branch are responsible for supporting crisis action planning.  
In the national arena, the system lacks a structure for effective 
coordination and synchronization. This inconsistency affects its ability to harness 
and effectively bring to bear the collective capabilities of the nation. Christine 
Wormuth, now a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Obama 
Administration, explains it as follows,  
managing the response to a major catastrophe successfully will 
involve every part of American society—the federal government, 
state and local governments, the private sector, the 
nongovernmental sector, and individuals themselves. No single 
government agency, private company, or charitable organization 
can possibly provide all that will be required in the face of a major 
disaster. The key to a successful response to major disasters in the 
future will be finding ways to leverage the particular capabilities of 
many parts of society while these diverse disciplines and tools are 
brought together for maximum effect. (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 
2008, p. 1) 
In summary, the national planning system provides a structure for the 
interagency coordination and vetting of national strategies, strategic plans and 
policies. In the last few years, the system has vetted a significant number of 
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homeland security strategies and policies that sought to integrate and 
synchronize the efforts of the government. While there may be some debate 
about the overall quality or effectiveness of these initiatives, the fact that the 
system was able to process a fair number of them within a reasonable amount of 
time indicates, that at this level, the system does work as designed. This does 
not mean that the system is perfect and there is no need for reform. On the 
contrary, the challenges and complexities of the modern environment probably 
make a compelling case for Congress to reform the system (Project for National 
Security Reform, 2008). However, until this reform is enacted, there is a 
compelling case as well to improve the operational planning system since the 
system is not performing and the nation cannot afford another strategic failure 
caused by its deficiencies. As Americans, it is tempting to think that the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina led to major restructuring and countless 
proposals for government reform only in the United States. Even more surprising 
is to discover that other nations implemented major government reform based on 
the lessons learned from these catastrophic events. Chapter IV examines three 
countries that took reform steps direct affecting their national planning and 
preparedness systems.  
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IV. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO EMERGENCY 
PLANNING 
Plans are of little importance, but planning is essential. 
 Winston Churchill 
Plans are nothing; planning is everything. 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Planning is recognized globally as an essential element of any enterprise 
in modern times. Public and private entities have developed planning systems, 
structures and processes that seek to anticipate and prepare for every possible 
contingency that may have an effect on their endeavors. Historically, 
catastrophes serve as the catalyst that cause increased scrutiny on planning 
systems. As previously discussed, in the United States, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and Hurricane Katrina were benchmark events that resulted in major revisions of 
the federal government planning processes. Although these events were “local” 
to the United States, they significantly impacted the international community and 
influenced substantially national approaches to planning.  
This chapter is a comparative analysis of the approaches to planning by 
three English-speaking countries: Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand. This 
analysis focuses on how these countries approach the coordination, integration 
and synchronization of operational plans at the federal or national level. In recent 
years, none of the countries selected experienced a major national catastrophe 
or terrorist attack that may have triggered a major government reorganization. 
However, as with many nations around the world, they empathized with the 
United States when it was struck twice by catastrophes in the new century, and 
not long after, reorganized their systems. This empathy was not solely caused by 
traditional alliances, but more likely from the realization that if the world’s only 
superpower could be brought to the edge of the abyss, so could they. The 
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analysis recognizes that the governmental structures of these countries are 
significantly different from those of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, some of 
their approaches provide some insights that could be applied in the United 
States. Moreover, the analysis uses historical precedents in the United States 
that correlates these insights to the U.S. system and suggests that their 
adaptation is possible. 
B. GLOBAL CONTEXT 
On the outset of the World War II, President Roosevelt issued EO 8757 
transferring civil defense and emergency management responsibility from the 
War Department to the Office of Emergency Management in the Executive Office 
of the President (Roosevelt, 1941). Before that time, the military was the sole 
agency in charge of providing disaster relief in the United States. Many third 
world countries today use the military in the same way; primarily, because their 
civilian agencies have little or no capabilities to provide these services (Miskel, 
2006, p. 109). On the other hand, among the developed countries, emergency 
planning systems are as diverse as their forms of government. However, that 
does not mean that these systems have evolved in a vacuum. A popular saying 
states that a smart person learns from his or her own mistakes, but a genius 
learns from other people’s mistakes. The United States has been in a fishbowl 
since 2001 in the domestic and international arenas. Katrina, Iraq, 9/11, and 
Afghanistan are the case studies that have shown the good, the bad and the ugly 
of the U.S. system. While no evidence exists to indicate that countries are 
rushing to copy the U.S.’s interagency and emergency planning systems, there is 
a concerted effort from many nations to learn from the U.S.’s experiences.50 This 
fishbowl experiment produced a new worldview on the disastrous consequences 
of failing to integrate and synchronize all the elements of national power. Thus, 
just like the United States, they place a premium on deliberate planning, but  
 
                                            
50 i.e., U.K., N.Z. AUS published Katrina lessons learned that could be applied to their 
systems. N.Z. sent a team of experts to the United States to conduct a Katrina study. 
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more importantly, have modified their systems to meet their situation and needs. 
Some modifications are subtle, some are major, but as seen later, their changes 
are not totally foreign.  
C. PLANNING APPROACHES 
1. Ireland: The Planning Uber-Department 
The Ireland National Government makes a clear distinction between 
planning and operations. The Minister of Defense (MOD) is responsible for 
providing policy and direction for the national emergency preparedness planning 
efforts while the Minister of Environment, Heritage and Local Government is 
responsible for oversight and implementation of the national response 
framework. Both ministers chair minister level groups that serve as coordinating 
mechanisms for planning and response respectively. The MOD chairs the 
Government Task Force on Emergency Planning that provides active leadership 
of the emergency planning process; facilitates contact and co-ordination between 
government departments and other public authorities; and oversees all 
emergency planning (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.   Ireland’s Emergency Planning Structure (From Strategic 
Emergency Planning Guidance) 
The Inter-Departmental Working Group on Emergency Planning, chaired 
by the Office of Emergency Planning, Department of Defence, provides support 
for the policy initiatives of the Minister for Defence as chair of the Government 
Task Force. The National Security Committee is concerned with ensuring that the 
Government is advised on high-level security matters. The committee is chaired 
by the Secretary General to the Government and comprises senior 
representatives of the Department of the Taoiseach; Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform; An Garda Síochána; Department of Defence; Defence 
Forces; and Department of Foreign Affairs (Department of Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform). 
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The Minister of Defence with this authority provides the policy that guides 
the whole of government effort in developing plans for national emergencies. For 
instance, this structure allowed him to develop the 2004 the Strategic Emergency 
Planning Guide to guide the departments in the management of the planning 
processes. This organizational structure for planning is heavily dependent on 
legislation that codifies the authorities of one department over others. In this 
sense, the research indicates that by keeping the authorities of the Minister of 
Defence separate from the operational framework, the structure provides the 
government the advantage of using military planning systems to develop national 
plans. The Irish military, like in many western countries, has a fairly modern 
planning capability that can easily absorb the functional planning areas of other 
departments. Furthermore, by separating the operational framework from 
planning, the Irish Government effectively dealt with the issue of militarizing 
emergency response.  
2. Canada: Collaboration with Muscle 
The Canadian approach to planning is fundamentally based on strong 
legislation that gives the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
Canada (PSEPC) a prominent leadership role in directing the preparedness and 
planning framework for the country. The Emergency Management Act of 2007 
gives the following authorities to the Minister of Public Safety. 
 Establishing policies, programs and other measures respecting the 
preparation, maintenance, testing and implementation by a 
government institution of emergency management plans 
 Providing advice to government institutions respecting the 
preparation, maintenance, testing and implementation of 
emergency management plans 
 Analyzing and evaluating emergency management plans prepared 




Figure 5.   PSEPC Responsibilities and Relationships (From PSEPC RPP 
2004–2005) 
Armed with these authorities, the PSEPC has the capability to establish 
federal guidelines and regulations to synchronize and coordinate the planning 
efforts of other federal departments, provinces, and the private sector (Figure 5). 
In essence, the legislation gives the PSEPC the tools to establish a compliance 
regime for a whole of government approach to planning. However, unlike Ireland, 
where planning and response are separate functions, in Canada, PSEPC has the 
responsibility for both planning and response. 
The problem is that Canada faces challenges similar to the Department of 
Homeland Security in the United States; whereas the responsibility for response 
does not have sufficient authorities to “herd the cats” and establish a compliance 
regime from other departments. Since the legislation was passed, PSEPC 
progress on both areas have been checkered according to the 2008 Emergency 
Preparedness in Canada report from the Canadian Standing Senate Committee  
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on National Security and Defence. Their findings indicate that PSEPC has not 
used its authority to drive interagency planning in Canada (Parliament of 
Canada, 2008).  
In response to these findings, PSEPC has undertaken a major effort to 
establish the mechanisms to coordinate and synchronize federal plans. At the 
federal level, an initiative is underway to establish a Federal Emergency Planners 
Group at the director level and above to set policy and oversee the development 
of plans. Additionally, the government is contemplating forming a governance 
body at the ministerial level to provide the political direction for the emergency 
preparedness efforts.51  
3. New Zealand: A Cluster Structure 
The New Zealand approach to emergency planning relies on a 
collaborative structure codified by legislation with specific mandates on its design 
and responsibilities. The core of this structure is the regional Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups), which are given the 
responsibility for both preparedness and response.  
The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the CDEM 
Act) came into force on 1 December 2002, providing the legislative 
basis for establishing CDEM Groups. A key responsibility of a 
CDEM Group is the development and implementation of a 
comprehensive, publicly consulted CDEM Group Plan. CDEM 
Group Plans form an important part of the CDEM framework in New 
Zealand as they state and provide for the hazards and risks to be 
managed by the CDEM Group, as well as specify the CDEM 
arrangements necessary to meet those hazards and risks and state 
the roles and responsibilities of those involved. (Civil Defense and 
Emergency Management) 
New Zealand organizes the preparedness structure around what it calls 
clusters of multiple organizations that have emergency management 
responsibilities. These clusters are essentially multi-agency groups that have a 
                                            
51 Author’s non-attribution conversation with senior official in the PSEPC. Terms of reference 
for both initiatives are under staffing but not available to the public. 
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flexible structure to integrate multiple sectors and jurisdictions. At the National 
level, these clusters increase preparedness posture by 1) clarifying goals, 
responsibilities and roles for civil defence emergencies; 2) identifying gaps in 
capability and capacity; and 3) addressing the gaps in capability and capacity 
through emergency management action plans (Ministry of Civil Defense and 
Emergency Management, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 6.   CDEM Planning Relationships (From CDEM Group Plan Review) 
The CDEM Act requires the ministries to develop agency emergency 
plans and require their integration with the CDEM groups both at the national and 
regional level (Figure 6). This system is further synchronized by the broad 
authorities given to the Director of Civil Defense and Emergency Management to 
set policy and guidelines for the clustering of agencies in the planning process. 
Thus, these clusters are expected to operate in a coordinated multi-agency 
environment that is flexible permitting national agencies involved to join, exit or 
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merge with other clusters as circumstances dictate, allowing for overlap of 
functions and membership where circumstances dictate (Ministry of Civil Defense 
and Emergency Management, 2006). In summary, New Zealand’s approach to 
emergency planning is a codified structure that directs multi-agency planning by 
forming specific groups at the national, regional and local level with the 
necessary authorities to coordinate and synchronize emergency planning.  
D. ANALYSIS 
These approaches to emergency planning and preparedness at face value 
tend to be as divergent as the political systems for which they were developed. 
This fact brings the first obvious lesson of the analysis; planning and emergency 
preparedness systems have to conform to the political structures and realities of 
the country. In the case of Ireland, the novel idea of separating the planning and 
response functions allowed them to take advantage of a natural planning 
capability that traditionally resides with the military establishments. Furthermore, 
although the Minister of Defence is responsible for emergency planning, he has 
to integrate other ministries in their development because the system calls for the 
employment of a senior level task force to institutionalize coordination and 
synchronization of plans. In contrast, in the United States, the federal 
departments develop their plans independently even though a good number of 
them lack the capacity to perform effective operational planning for large-scale 
catastrophic incidents (Mayer & Carafano, 2007). The federal government does 
not have a dedicated senior level group where its members have the expertise 
and authority to institutionalize the synchronization and coordination of plans.52 
In the case of Canada, who as a neighbor has adopted many of the U.S. 
homeland security processes, it has been seen that their Parliament weighed 
significant authorities on the Minister of Public Safety to synchronize and 
coordinate emergency planning. Yet, because the functions of preparedness and 
response fall under a single portfolio, it may detract from their ability to lead 
                                            
52 DRG is the closest thing but members lack authority to force these functions.) 
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effectively and improve the national planning efforts. Just like in the United 
States, the government of Canada has expended vast amounts of resources in 
increasing the response capabilities since they carry the higher political risk. As 
stated before, planning only comes under scrutiny when a catastrophe happens 
and the government response does not meet expectations. While the 
parliamentary system may allow a department to have functional authority over 
another department, the United States’ federal traditions do not allow Congress 
to pass legislation granting those authorities. Notwithstanding the conflicts that it 
would create among the federal departments, the committee system in 
Congress, which provides oversight over the federal departments, would most 
likely resist changes that affect their functions and appropriation realms.  
New Zealand’s approach to legislate collaborative structures for response 
and preparedness seems to be an advanced concept that merits further 
exploration. Granted, their political system allows them to legislate and regulate 
to the local level, but their inclusion of private sector and non-governmental 
organizations as equal partners in these clusters and CDEM Groups seems to be 
a better way to harness national power. New Zealand’s approach not only 
optimizes emergency planning but it also makes better use of existing 
capabilities by placing responsibilities on the appropriate level for the 
development of plans and the conduct of response operations. In the United 
States, the U.S. system tends to have an ad hoc relationship with the private 
sector and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, the federal 
government has a history of not treating the states and local governments as 
equal partners (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 52).53 New Zealand’s legislation 
levels the field by ensuring that these entities are equal partners with the national 
government. This approach is radically different from that of the United States 
since the Executive Branch has traditionally prescribed the structures for 
coordination with other partners in the areas of preparedness and response. That 
                                            
53 See also PNSR State and Local Issue Analysis, GAO 08-868T and Birkland and 
Waterman. 
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is precisely the problem, since the federal government tends to establish 
processes that impact the states and locals without proper consultation and 
participation from affected parties.  
E. PRINCIPLES AND PRECEDENTS 
The case studies of Ireland, Canada and New Zealand provide diverse 
approaches for organizing national emergency planning systems. While their 
systems may not be adaptable to the United States, some core principles may 
have applications that can significantly improve the federal planning system. The 
Irish model of an “Uber-Department” for planning and the Canadian model of a 
department in charge of both operations and planning are not adaptable to the 
United States’ federal system because as stated before, it gives a department 
head executive authority over other departments. This supervisory and oversight 
authority is typically reserved for the President by the Constitution and federal 
law. On the other hand, the Irish core principle of separating the planning and 
operations functions is an approach that has potential for application for federal 
operational planning. By separating these functions, the federal government 
could establish a structure above the federal departments focused on 
synchronization and coordination of plans without competing with the 
departments’ traditional authorities for operations and resourcing. Historical 
precedents in the United States support this principle.  
During the 1950s, when the Cold War was exploding and the National 
Security System was not mature, President Eisenhower restructured the NSC 
along these lines. In a similar way in the post 9/11 strategic environment, the 
Cold War’s pressing challenges were consuming the National Security Council at 
the expense of their ability to shape the environment by developing long-range 
policies and strategies. President Eisenhower divided the functional structure of 
the NSC to address this problem and provide strategic maneuvering room. 
Eisenhower, whose military background led him to place a premium on planning, 
as well as on operational coordination, established a Planning Board to provide 
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oversight over the development of policies and strategy and an Operations 
Coordinating Board to oversee the implementation of policy. These boards were 
senior level groups of assistant secretaries or higher from agencies statutorily 
represented in the NSC, which were empowered to perform these functions 
(Congressional Research Service, 2009, p. 8). Although some scholars have 
criticized this structure as overly complex and rigid, most agree that this system 
was able to establish accepted national security policies , which were 
implemented throughout the government and laid the basis for sustained 
competition with the Soviet Union for several decades (Congressional Research 
Service, 2009, p. 9).  
This functional division is not an obsolete organizational concept. On the 
contrary, it is alive and well in the public and private sectors. For instance, in the 
Armed Forces Joint Staff, the functions are divided even more sophisticatedly 
between strategic planning (J5), operational planning (J7) and operations (J3) 
(The Joint Staff). Another less obvious example resides on the Department of 
Defense itself, whereas the Joint Staff is responsible for military strategies and 
plans while the Office of the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for 
setting policy for the Department. However, one example more relevant to the 
interagency system is found on the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), 
which was originally established by Executive Order and later on codified by 
legislation (Bush, National Counterterrorism Center, 2004). Among the missions 
given by law to the NCTC are the responsibility for conducting strategic 
operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of 
national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland 
security, law enforcement activities within and among agencies, and to assign 
roles and responsibilities as part of its strategic operational planning duties to 
lead departments or agencies, as appropriate, for counterterrorism activities 
consistent with applicable law and that support counterterrorism strategic 
operational plans, but shall not direct the execution of any resulting operations 
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(U.S. Congress, 2004).54 The NCTC example demonstrates that the U.S. federal 
system can indeed codify by directive or legislation an interagency organization 
that has as its purpose the synchronization and coordination of federal 
emergency planning while leaving operations as the domain of the federal 
departments.  
The Canadian legislative approach of using specific functional authorities 
could be emulated to create and support this structure. Congress would have to 
enact legislation providing the structure specific authorities that keep the focus on 
planning without infringing on the operational and resourcing authorities of the 
federal departments. Again, the legislation authorizing the NCTC exhibits some 
of these traits by providing these guidelines, which makes this approach feasible 
for operational planning as well. The recent case of the Christmas Bomber has 
brought into question whether the NCTC has the teeth to force the coordination 
and synchronization among the Intelligence agencies. Be what it may, clearly, 
NCTC is prohibited from directing federal departments, but a precedent within the 
federal government exists where an agency can force department compliance 
without the involvement of the President. That agency is the EPA, and the 
methodology it uses is based on legislation that gives them responsibility for the 
enforcement of compliance by establishing federal regulations for the nation, as 
well as for the federal government. The EPA has the power to fine other federal 
departments, as well as the power to refer them to the Department of Justice for 
prosecution when appropriate (Department of Justice, 2000). As previously 
discussed, the Post Katrina Act and several other statutes require the 
departments to develop operational plans and a number of capabilities to 
respond to national catastrophes. It was also demonstrated that compliance was 
an issue even for national directed priorities like the NIMS. While this may seem 
a wacky example, the purpose is not to argue that Congress give an interagency 
organization the power to fine or refer for prosecution federal departments as an 
enforcement tool. The argument is for the empowerment of this organization for 
                                            
54 Section 1021. 
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the development of federal regulations that drive, to some degree, the federal 
planning and preparedness process. This is essential, especially, if the federal 
government seeks to integrate non-federal jurisdictions as equal partners like 
New Zealand does.  
The Kiwi approach, of forming clusters with authorities for planning and 
operations, runs into a different but not less formidable challenge for 
implementation at the national level than the Irish and Canadian approaches. 
The cluster can be similar to the construct of the Combatant Commands used by 
DoD and legislated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This approach may require a 
wholesale organization of the federal government because it basically changes 
the role of the departments to resource providers (force providers) and creates 
an organization that has both planning and operational authorities. The model’s 
scalability for regional, state and local jurisdictions is a natural advantage but 
also can be a source of opposition because it requires acceptance and 
implementation by all States.55 While maybe seen as an evolution in the future of 
this kind, it is doubtful that the United States is ready for that type of reform, and 
even less likely, that Congress is to go along with it because it requires its 
reorganization as well. On the other hand, the Kiwi core principle of integrating 
the private sector and non-governmental organizations into the cluster is a 
construct that should be included in any future design structure for federal 
operational planning. Again, this requires specific authorities granted by 
legislation that allows and supports their participation as partners in a federal 
structure. Other than government appointed commissions, there does not seem 
to be any evidence of a cluster type structure in the United States that has been 
codified by directive or legislation to coordinate and synchronize multi-sector 
entities. Surprisingly, the U.S. military has a doctrine in place on how to establish 
and use an organization similar to the Kiwi Cluster, although it is designed for 
Peace Keeping Operations.  
                                            
55 Even under IPS and ICS, most states have their own way of doing things and fiercely 
defend their prerogatives on how to organize their government. 
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The doctrine has been in place since 1994 when the U.S. military became 
more involved in global peacekeeping operations under the Clinton 
Administration (The Joint Staff, 1994). It was recently revised and incorporated 
under JP-1 (Joint Publication), the Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United 
States and in JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and 
Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations. The term 
that the U.S. military uses for the cluster is a Civil-Military Operations Center 
(CMOC). The function of this center, in similar fashion as a Kiwi Cluster, revolves 
around coordinating and synchronizing planning and operations among multi-
sector organizations. More close to the homeland, the state of Florida is using a 
“Megacommunity” framework to plan, coordinate and synchronize its emergency 
preparedness efforts. The state of Florida 
began creating a new approach that involved a variety of 
organizations—public, private, and civil—in their emergency 
planning and activities. It had become clear that no government 
agency could manage this type of large-scale catastrophe on its 
own. Each local, state, and federal agency tasked with emergency 
management had only part of the resources or knowledge needed 
to address a wide-ranging disaster that might strike at businesses, 
transportation nodes, utility infrastructures, water and food supplies, 
law enforcement, hospitals and medical services, communications 
networks, and other crucial services. So Florida expanded its 
planning process to include essential stakeholders at all levels of 
government, as well as private-sector, charitable, and faith-based 
organizations. (Himberger, Sulek, & Krill Jr., 2007) 
Both the military and Florida examples have a major weakness when 
contrasted against the Kiwi Cluster approach. That weakness resides in the fact 
that these are ad hoc arrangements instead of a codified structure. Therefore, 
their use and effectiveness, as in any ad hoc organization, is subject to multiple 
variables ranging from funding, to capabilities to personalities that could limit or 
enhance its functionality. It is important to note a growing body of literature 
advocates this type of structure, regardless of its ad hoc nature; it is better suited 
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for the 21st century’s complex and multi-dimensional environment.56 That may or 
may not be the case, but since the issue at hand is to prepare for the nightmare 
scenarios, the government must take the lead and take action to move the ball 
forward with some sense of urgency.  
A key lesson from this analysis is that executive branch action is not 
enough. Appropriate legislation that in some way or other provides authorities to 
institutionalize the coordination and synchronization of plans is necessary. 
Legislation must be specific enough to separate planning and operational 
responsibilities. If it is not, it is doomed to perpetuate existing problems. As seen 
previously, Congress charged the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate 
planning efforts but did not provide the authority, structure or system to perform 
that function. The NCTC serves as a precedent that Congress can indeed 
authorize an organizational structure to perform that function. New Zealand’s 
legislation including private sector and non-governmental organizations in the 
cluster system of CDEM Groups is a novel approach that can serve to harness 
all the elements of national power.  
In summary, the analysis indicates that the models used by Ireland, 
Canada and New Zealand to organize their emergency planning structures may 
not be feasible for application in the United States. However, their three 
respective core principles, 1) separation of planning and operations functions, 2) 
legislation that provide structure and authorities for processes, and 3) formal 
integration of private sector and non-governmental organizations as members of 
federal level structures, merits consideration since it can help develop a whole of 
government approach to emergency planning. The question is how best to 
accomplish this task? In Chapter V, frames a proposal for improving federal 
operational planning using the core principles presented in this chapter and 
conceptual nuggets from the case study analysis in Chapter III.  
                                            
56 Among them: Starfish and the Spider, Megacommunities. 
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V. THE CENTER 
Using the commission‘s analogy of the different departments and 
agencies acting like a set of specialists in a hospital without an 
attending physician, we can say the commission settled for a 
specialist who could offer a second opinion without providing the 
attending physician who directs the operations. Not surprisingly, to 
date the departments and agencies have treated the National 
Counterterrorism Center as a source for second opinions. The 
reality is that all priority national security missions—not just 
counterterrorism require an attending physician. (Project for 
National Security Reform, 2008, p. 609) 
I am dying from the treatment of too many physicians. 
 Alexander the Great 
 
A. THE CONSENSUS 
There is a growing community of interest calling for the overhaul and 
modernization of the national security system and its components (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, 2008). A number of prominent organizations 
and experts who have thoroughly studied the history and structure of the federal 
government support their calls.57 However, achieving a consensus on how to fix 
the system in the short term is another matter (U.S. Congressional Research 
Service, 2008, p. 3). Part of the underlying problem rests with the sheer scale 
and complexity of the National Security System. The other part is the number of 
stakeholders and the diversity of the equities involved. The major reform studies 
and proposals are primarily focused on the foreign and strategic aspects of 
national security and typically address homeland security as a component of the 
overall system. Specifically, the studies draw inferences from numerous case 
studies both abroad and in the United States that indicate a consistent failure on 
the ability of the federal government to coordinate and synchronize interagency 
planning and operations. Granted, homeland security is undeniably a part of the 
                                            
57 PNSR, CSIS, Markle Foundation, Heritage Foundation, Academia, Commissions, etc. 
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system and any reform eventually affects its overall structure and processes. 
Still, the case study in Chapter III and the principles from Chapter IV provide a 
basis to develop an interim alternative to markedly improve the planning 
structures for homeland security, especially when considering it a system that 
consists of independent elements that must work together to achieve common 
outcomes (Miskel, 2006, p. 3). Rather than waiting for the long debate process or 
the next catastrophe to drive changes, a more sensible and timely approach is to 
focus on those areas in which a general consensus exists, and based on these, 
develop an option to optimize the system at least for the short term. 
A number of areas where the community of interest sees eye to eye do 
exist. First, there is general agreement that planning is paramount and an 
essential element of the national security system. However, what does that 
mean? There are two categories of planning and the understanding of the 
differences between the two is essential to conceptualize why planning is a 
national priority and its critical importance for the effectiveness of the system. 
Contingency (also known as deliberative or deliberate) planning is the process of 
developing strategic and operational plans based upon facts or assumptions 
about the circumstances involved in a hypothetical situation; in other words, they 
are created in advance of events (U.S. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2009, p. I-1). The other type of planning, crisis action, is the process for 
rapidly adapting existing CONPLANs and OPLANs to the actual circumstances of 
the incident (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009, p. 1-5). Thus, 
when the NRF and presidential directives state that planning is a national priority, 
they are in essence referring to a deliberate planning system because the 
objective is to be prepared before an incident happens. On the other hand, Crisis 
Action Planning is the planning that occurs during the incident, which is not really 
an option, since one way or the other, it must occur with or without pre-existing 
plans. Deliberative plans are not playbooks for emergencies that can be pulled 
out of a shelf to run operations magically. Moltke’s admonition that no plan of  
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battle ever survives contact with the enemy serves as a warning. The main 
purpose of deliberative planning is to ease the transition to crisis action planning 
and put all the pieces in place for effective action (The Joint Staff, 2009).  
Second, in the context of national security, no significant issues exists 
about the ability of the federal government to respond to disasters adequately, 
but that is not the case for catastrophic incidents. During the last thirty-five years, 
there have been 1300 presidential disaster declarations where the federal 
government mobilized resources or assets to support the states (Miskel, 2006, p. 
132).58 The overall performance of the federal government during the 
overwhelming majority of these disasters was adequate and did not trigger any 
popular outcry for reform. Furthermore, the federal government has been fairly 
effective in responding to major foreign catastrophes. In this area, the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami and hurricane relief in Central America and the Caribbean 
are recent examples of a fairly effective response that did not trigger significant 
criticism.59 Unfortunately, that degree of confidence is not transferred to complex 
overseas contingencies or major national level catastrophes. In this case, the 
consensus is that current structure of the national security system can lead to a 
failure the next time the system is tested either in an overseas contingency or in 
a major national catastrophe.60 The historical evidence is vast pointing to a 
consistent pattern that has not changed much in the last three decades. The 
expectation for failure is high and it is attributed to an antiquated dysfunctional 
interagency system unable to harness all elements of national power (U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 1). This is the primary impetus for 
reforming the whole national security system, including its homeland security 
component.  
 
                                            
58 According to DSB, FEMA lists over 1700 since 1953. 
59 The jury is still out on Haiti Earthquake response. 
60 This view is shared by PNSR, CSIS, and Miskel. 
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Third, a general consensus exists that effective plans and operations must 
be fully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized both horizontally and vertically 
(U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 14). Interagency structures 
and/or multi-disciplinary teams are thought to be the optimal structure for 
harnessing the collective power of multi-sector stakeholders with a wide range of 
capabilities and equities. These insights were derived from a number of historical 
case studies on the performance of the federal government during complex 
operations both domestically and overseas. In the homeland, this requirement for 
integration includes non-federal jurisdictions (state, local and tribal), non-
governmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector. The non-federal 
stakeholders have critical responsibilities and essential capabilities that they 
bring to bear to any domestic incident. It is generally agreed that the current 
federal planning structure has not been able to integrate and harness these 
collective capabilities fully. Moreover, this recurring shortcoming cast doubts that 
“lead agencies” can somehow serve as a catalyst to integrate the full range of 
stakeholders and fulfill this role. As shown by the case study in Chapter III, the 
model has not been particularly successful in this area, especially in regards to 
horizontal coordination among federal departments. 
Fourth, any reform effort must include end-to-end processes that link the 
ends, ways and means of national strategies (U.S. Congressional Research 
Service, 2008, p. 12). It must provide a systemic and sustainable improvement to 
the process of translating national security objectives to specific interagency 
roles, missions, and operations that can effectively integrate the instruments of 
national power and align national resources accordingly (Said & Holt, 2008, p. 
35). While many proposals are on the table on how to achieve this, the implied 
common denominator of all the proposals is that they assume that departments 
have the capability and willingness to produce the necessary plans required to 
achieve the ends of the strategy. Money talks! Therefore, most proposals are 
linked to the establishment of a budget process that would compel the agencies 
to link their plans to the strategic objectives as part of their budget process. As 
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seen previously in the previous chapter, the assumption that all agencies have 
equal capacity and drive to develop the required operational plans may be 
flawed. Regardless, this is a major hurdle on its own merits because any 
changes concerning budget must also include Congress. The implication is that 
Congress must reform the committee structure that has oversight and 
appropriation responsibility over national security, including the 31 agencies that 
have homeland security responsibility. The White House identified 88 committees 
and subcommittees that might be considered to exercise authority over some 
aspect of homeland security (Carafano & Rosenzweig, 2005, p. 63). This 
particular issue makes the reform of the National Security System a hard and 
long-term proposition similar to that experienced during the Goldwater-Nichols 
effort to reform the Department of Defense. Nevertheless, the proposals 
recognize that any system involving multiple agencies must have some sort of 
structure to provide oversight and drive the process within the executive branch. 
This concept then broaches the last major area of consensus, which is that 
someone must be in charge of coordinating and integrating national security 
efforts (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 14). 
Unfortunately, no general consensus exists as to whom or how, which is 
because most analyses do not consider the planning and operations functions 
separately, and some cases, intertwine them in the debate on whether the NSC 
must focus solely on policy and strategy or whether it should have an operational 
role (Project for National Security Reform, 2008, pp. 17–20). There is a general 
trend in the literature to place substantial planning responsibility on the NSC 
(Project for National Security Reform, p. F-6). This is the case with both the CSIS 
and PNSR reports that advocate an overhaul of the national security system. The 
CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report recommends an interagency planning 
body housed at DHS but under the supervision of a Director of Strategic Planning 
at the NSC. This idea supports their position that the NSC focus should be on 
policy and strategy (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 51).61 Conversely, the 
                                            
61 Also mentioned on PNSR State/Local, p. 18. 
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PNSR has an operational vision of the NSC that includes decentralized 
implementation by federal departments and interagency teams. They 
recommend that the NSC develop a new federal interagency system to manage 
the end-to-end linkage from policy to execution, which may imply some overlap 
over operational planning (Project for National Security Reform, 2009, p. 207). 
While not specifically pinning the rose on any organization in particular for 
planning, the PNSR advocates for the creation of a Homeland Security 
Collaboration Committee at the NSC with a “formal and systematic,  up‐front 
concur/non‐concur  responsibility  for  strategic  guidance,  assessment, 
strategy/policy  formulation,  and  implementation/evaluation,  and  as  may  be 
required, issue management” (Project for National Security Reform, 2009, pp. 212–




There are also proponents for keeping DHS and FEMA as the lead for 
planning and operational coordination and synchronization. Among them is 
former DHS Secretary Ridge, who in his recent book, argued that Congress 
should reorganize DHS along regional lines to improve integration of emergency 
plans and mutual aid pacts, and for building a seamless information-sharing 
network (Ridge, 2009, p. 261). His successor’s DHS memoir made no mention of 
a regional construct, but like Secretary Ridge, states that the synchronization of 
operational planning should reside within DHS and the guiding of policy in the 
White House (Chertoff, 2009, p. 148). Evidently, both secretaries subscribe to the 
Hart-Rudman Commission’s concept that a federal department should have the 
lead for coordinating and synchronizing planning and operations for homeland 
security (U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2001).  
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On the other side of the spectrum, James F. Miskel proposes that 
oversight for the federal and system wide preparedness should be taken from 
FEMA and added to the vice president’s portfolio or assigned to an Emergency 
Management Council as an office in the White House (Miskel, 2006, p. 141). 
However, unlike the previous recommendations examined, Miskel does not 
provide a structure or process by which the Office of the Vice President or the 
Emergency Management Council could exercise this responsibility. As stated 
before, a wide range of options exists on how to improve, transform or even 
overhaul the national security system, including its homeland security 
component. The options range from the very conservative represented by the 
numerous GAO findings that emphasize lead agency responsibility and more 
governance, to those who advocate a comprehensive reform of the system 
represented by CSIS and PNSR. In between, there is a multitude of ad hoc 
proposals for incremental improvements based on leadership, budget, culture 
and issue-specific (as a result of incidents) themes improvements, which could 
also have an impact on the planning system (Said & Holt, 2008, p. 50).  
B. A NOT-SO-NEW IDEA 
There is no doubt that the motivation for reform effort is based on serious 
concerns that the U.S. national security system, and by default, the homeland 
security system, is not ready for the next Super Bowl of catastrophes. While 
debate and reflection are paramount, time is not on our side. Rather than going 
for the 100% solution, perhaps another perspective can provide an interim 
solution that moves the ball in the right direction until the nation can implement 
comprehensive reform. By examining the five areas of consensus through the 
prism of the three principles discussed in Chapter IV, (the separation of planning 
and operations functions; legislation that provide structure and authorities for 
processes; and formal integration of private sector and non-governmental 




emerges that can substantially move the ball forward while minimizing some of 
the planning system’s core problems. That alternative is the establishment of a 
Center for National Catastrophe Planning (CNCP).  
A CNCP provides a structure by which to capitalize on the five areas of 
consensus within the current constraints of the federal government to 
incrementally and deliberately close the development, coordination and 
synchronization catastrophic planning gaps in the federal system. This notional 
organization can have the three attributes derived from the principles discussed. 
First, its mission and functions can be limited to deliberate catastrophic planning 
at the federal level with no role in the conduct of operations. Second, it can have 
specific authorities to develop, implement and assess federal level catastrophic 
planning policies. Third, it can be a fully integrated organization that incorporates 
federal and non-federal stakeholders representing a cross-section of government 
and non-government sectors in the federal catastrophic planning structure. The 
following section provides an overview of the potential mission, functions and 
structure of the Center for National Catastrophe Planning.  
C. NOTIONAL CENTER FOR NATIONAL CATASTROPHE PLANNING 
1. Mission 
Serve as the primary organization in the U.S. government responsible for 
the development of integrated, interagency strategic and operational plans for 
responding to catastrophic events, and for establishing and implementing the 
doctrine and processes of the national planning system (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 
2008, p. 10). 
2. Functions 
 Develops integrated, federal level interagency strategic and 
operational plans for responding to catastrophic events (Wormuth & 
Witkowsky, 2008, p. 10). 
 Coordinate, synchronize, and integrate federal catastrophic 
planning efforts to integrate all elements of national power and 
improve effectiveness. 
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 Assign roles and responsibilities as part of its strategic and 
operational planning duties to departments or agencies, as 
appropriate, for development of agency plans consistent with 
applicable law and support federal catastrophic response strategic 
and operational plans, but shall not direct the execution of any 
resulting operations or response efforts (U.S. Congress, 2004).  
 Consistent with appropriate statutes, implements a Catastrophic 
Planning Regulatory Framework at the federal level to establish 
policies, programs and other measures respecting the preparation, 
maintenance, testing and validation of federal catastrophic plans; 
analyzing and evaluating catastrophic plans prepared by federal 
agencies and identifying gaps in capability and capacity (Parliament 
of Canada, 2007). 
 To ensure that agencies and non-federal jurisdictions, as 
appropriate, have access to and receive planning data needed to 
execute their catastrophic response plans or perform independent, 
alternative analysis (U.S. Congress, 2004). 
 Pool resources to provide a cross-functional planning capability to 
agencies or departments that lack catastrophic planning capacity. 
 To serve as the National Center of Excellence for catastrophic 
planning doctrine, exercises, education and technology. 
3. Structure  
The President designates the Vice President of the United States as the 
National Emergency Preparedness Manager with overall responsibility for 
overseeing national preparedness efforts and to chair the center’s Board of 
Governors. The President appoints the Board of Governors for a period of three 
years consisting of (8) Federal Secretary Deputies, (2) Governors, (2) National 
NGOs, (2) Metropolitan Mayors, and (2) Private Sector CEOs to provide active 
public and multi-sector leadership, to facilitate contact and coordination between 
government departments and other public authorities, and to oversee all 
emergency planning. The director is appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate and is responsible for the overall functioning of the center and for 




Counter Terrorism Center. Four functional groups consisting of federal 
interagency staff and fully funded positions for non-federal stakeholders 
representing multiple sectors and jurisdictions. See Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Proposed Structure of the Center for National Catastrophe Planning 
(CNCP) 
Strategic and Operational Planning Group: Develops federal level 
strategic and operational plans; coordinates, synchronizes and integrate planning 
efforts; and assigns planning roles and responsibilities to federal agencies; 
manages plan development program.  
Federal Operational Planning Support Group: Pool of cross-functional 
(logistics, transportation, communications, CBRNE, etc.) planners that support 
the development of catastrophic operational plans for those agencies that do not 
have full planning capacity. 
Policy, Doctrine and System Development Group: Develops the 
catastrophic planning regulatory framework at the federal level to establish 
policies, programs and other measures in respect to the preparation, 
maintenance, testing and validation of federal catastrophic plans.  
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Exercise, Assessment and Validation Group: Develops the federal 
catastrophic incident exercise program to test and validate federal level and 
agency operational plans; analyzes and evaluates catastrophic plans to identify 
gaps and overlap in capability and capacity; and could manage a federal 
readiness reporting system. 
The model presented above  is  an end state vision  requiring both executive 
and legislative action. A caveat is implied: the transition from the current system to 
the end state is scalable and may require measured steps similar to those that led to 
the  establishment  of  the NCTC,62 which  raises  another  point  that  needs  to  be  re‐
emphasized;  this  model,  like  the  NCTC,  is  not  the  100%  solution  to  fix  all  the 
problems in the homeland security planning system. This model, even in a reduced 
scale, can fix the chronic coordination and synchronization shortfalls at the federal 
level.  There  is  an  ongoing  debate  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  NCTC  but  a  general 
agreement  exists  that  it  is  a  better  alternative  than  the  one  that  existed  prior  to 
9/11  (Project  for  National  Security  Reform,  2009,  p.  109).  With  that  in  mind, 
consider some of the key features of the proposed structure. 
Vice President Joe Biden jokingly said, “it’s easy being the vice president. 
You don’t have to do anything” (Roberts & Argetsinger, 2010). This lighthearted 
remark hugely underscores the power of the Vice President and the potential 
weight he can bring as the Chairman of the NHSPC Board of Governors. Over 
the years, the Office of the Vice President has carried a number of portfolios in 
which he assumed the lead on behalf of the President, including crisis manager 
at the NSC and lead for government reform efforts, i.e., Crisis Manager under 
Reagan (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2008, p. 18); Government 
Performance Review under Clinton (Kamensky, 2001). In the National Security 
arena, the PNSR considered an option in which he would have been the nation’s 
National Security Manager (Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 485). 
                                            
62 Bush Administration established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center in 2003, which was 
replaced by the NCTC when it was established by Executive Order, and subsequently, codified 
by legislation. 
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However, this option was deemed problematic since it could lead to confusion on 
policy matters and accountability issues (Project for National Security Reform, 
2008, p. 458). Additionally, the tempo, scope and scale of national security 
issues require full time involvement, which can depend on the ability of the Vice 
President to take on this role. That is not the case if he were to assume 
responsibility for the national preparedness portfolio because it is not linked to 
real time events. As a statutory member of the National and Homeland Security 
Councils, he yields significant influence and voice over the nation’s grand 
strategy and policies (Kimmitt, 2008, p. 400). A lesser-known responsibility of 
considerable power is his position as Chair of the Budget Review Board, which is 
the first line of appeal for budget issues before the President (Project for National 
Security Reform, 2008, p. 378). These two responsibilities makes him the logical 
choice for leading the national emergency preparedness efforts for two reasons. 
First, he has the clout to ensure plans are linked to the administration strategies 
and policies, and second, he can influence the federal agency budget process to 
ensure they reflect planning priorities. In essence, this portfolio gives the Vice 
President responsibility for overseeing federal and system wide preparedness 
(Miskel, 2006, p. 141).  
The mix membership of the Board of Governors is necessary to assist the 
Vice President in integrating the federal preparedness efforts with major 
stakeholders at the national level. The integration of non-federal stakeholders is 
a critical element in most proposals for reforming or improving the national 
security system. This structure of the board is not unprecedented; the PNSR’s 
original recommendation for a Homeland Security Collaboration Committee had 
a similar structure (Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 589).63 The 
Obama Administration has clearly signaled that integration of stakeholders is one 
of its priorities as reflected in their findings during the Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review (QHSR) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 63). 
The QHSR implemented a systematic review process that incorporated the 
                                            
63 The PNSR rescinded the membership in a subsequent report Turning Ideas into Action. 
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participation of federal and non-federal stakeholders at various levels, including 
in an Executive Committee (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 
B6). Likewise, the President just recently issued an executive order creating the 
Council of Governors to provide a forum for them to provide advice and 
exchange information over matters dealing with homeland defense and civil 
support (Obama, 2010). Therefore, this structure is in line with the emerging 
policy of the Obama Administration. The Board of Governors would convene as 
often as necessary to provide guidance and direction to the director and address 
major policy issues under the chairmanship of the Vice President. Policy issues 
not resolved at this level could be elevated by the Vice President to the President 
for resolution or laterally passed by the Director to the National Security Advisor 
for deliberation in the interagency system. 
The duties and structure of the director’s office should be modeled on 
those prescribed by law for the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 
adjusted towards the catastrophic planning mission. In the same way as the 
NCTC, a dual reporting chain to the Vice President, and perhaps the National 
Security Advisor, should be considered to ensure a more formal linkage to the 
National Security System. The director should be confirmed by the Senate to 
establish the appropriate level of Congressional oversight. This oversight is 
required given that Congress would have to provide the funding and the 
legislative framework for the center eventually. This framework must include fully 
funded federal and non-federal positions and national catastrophic planning 
regulatory authorities, i.e., Federal Funds are provided to the Red Cross to fund 
positions for planning (Government Accountability Office, 2008, p. 56). Unlike the 
Environmental Protection Agency, which has punitive authorities, the center’s 
regulatory mandate should focus on establishing a compliance regime that 
includes a federal reporting system to assess readiness for catastrophic 
incidents.64 The horizontal group structure should be designed around the 
                                            
64 Consistent with current federal laws. 
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functions of the center and resourced accordingly. The functions of each group 
have a significant impact on the current system requiring methodical adjustment.  
For instance, the Strategic and Operational Planning Group could 
consolidate the IMPT and FEMA’s Operational Planning Branch and absorb their 
federal level strategic and operational planning functions. The responsibility for 
coordinating and integrating deliberate planning efforts can be assumed by the 
center. Both DHS and FEMA must retain capacity and responsibility for agency 
specific deliberate operational planning and crisis action planning, as well as the 
responsibility for coordinating federal response operations. The development of 
homeland security policy and strategy should remain the responsibility of the 
HSC. The Federal Operational Planning Support Group could serve as a 
resource center for federal departments that do not have the resources to 
develop the capacity for full spectrum planning. The Group mission should be to 
provide a cross functional planning capacity (logistics, CBRNE, etc.) to augment 
small federal agencies in their area specific operational planning efforts. This 
could significantly reduce their planning resource requirements allowing them to 
keep pace with larger agencies and also maintain an internal capacity for crisis 
action planning.  
The Policy, Doctrine and System Development Group would become the 
engine of the federal planning system, and perhaps, eventually drive a fully 
integrated national planning system. This group could develop a regulatory 
framework that ensures that federal plans are aligned as appropriate with the 
development of capabilities and resources for their execution. To do this, it could 
develop a federal catastrophic readiness reporting system that links federal plans 
to capabilities and resources. The Department of Defense Readiness Reporting 
System could be used as a model to develop a similar system for the federal 
government. Lastly, the Exercise, Assessment and Validation Group should have 
the responsibility for developing and implementing an exercise framework that 
systematically tests and stress federal catastrophic operational plans. This is 
required to ensure all levels of government have trained and exercised to these 
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plans, that the plans have guided investments in specific capability areas, and 
that mechanisms are in place to ensure these capabilities are ready when 
needed (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 11). In other words, assessing and 
validating the end-to-end process of the system.  
These notional structures are not absolutely perfect; most likely they must 
be further developed in detail to meet unforeseen practical considerations. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual framework is sound because it is built on the five 
areas of consensus. The establishment of the CNCP “operationalizes” the 
national priority by dedicating federal resources, for the first time in history, to 
focus exclusively on deliberate catastrophic planning. It establishes the structure 
outside the overburdened NSC Interagency system while maintaining the 
necessary connectivity to ensure synchronicity with policy and strategy. The 
center’s structure is fully integrated from top-to-bottom and right-to-left, which 
diffuses what has been a consistent shortcoming of the current system. The 
structure and authorities sought for the CNCP provides a framework for the 
development of a system that can accurately measure the end-to-end linkage 
from policy to execution at the federal level. Lastly, the proposal places the 
responsibility for emergency planning on the Vice President to provide adequate 
political power to drive the effort. While the proposal for the CNCP may reflect 
the areas of consensus, like any proposal for reform, downsides always exist that 
must be considered.  
D. BAD NEWS UP FRONT 
Establishing the CNCP at the federal level as an interagency and multi-
sector organization is not without challenges. First, an issue always exists with 
resources, both dollars and people. Second are the structural problems of an 
integrated organization functioning in a stovepipe environment. Lastly, is that 
pesky issue of interagency resistance, which could generate an initial drag on 
effectiveness and present its unique set of challenges. 
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1. Resources 
The CNCP requires considerable resources to establish and run. An 
organization of this type requires adequate funding for infrastructure and 
personnel, which, depending on its scale and scope, could be significant. Money 
is always an issue, specially now in a severely constrained budget environment. 
No one is immune from budget cuts, even the NCTC, a high priority organization 
with a real-time real-world mission came under the shadow of the knife recently 
(Strohm, 2010). A center focused on deliberate planning, by design, cannot yield 
the short-term “satisfaction” and constituency as its counter-terrorism 
counterpart. Just like NCTC, the center also faces systemic problems because 
congressional committee structures are not equipped to oversee and empower 
interagency mechanisms, which results in confused jurisdiction and inadequate 
support because their prioritization of resources and investments is oriented 
towards departmental functions, not national missions (Project for National 
Security Reform, 2010, p. XV). Therefore, it becomes an issue of risk and cost 
benefit analysis at the political level. The temptation is always there to rely on 
more governance to tweak the system (it is cheap) as done after Three Mile 
Island, Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, than expending serious dollars and 
political capital to implement a sensible solution to move forward from the status 
quo. In the end, the executive branch and Congress need to work hard to find 
adequate funding for this organization, if in fact, planning is a national priority. 
Nevertheless, the bottom line is either pay now or for sure, pay later.  
While infrastructure can be addressed by throwing money at it, personnel 
resources presents a variety of challenges that indeed could affect the overall 
effectiveness of the organization. First, federal departments and non-federal 
stakeholders must provide personnel to staff the center, a number of which must 
be planners. If past is prologue, federal agencies do not have a good track record 
in supporting this type of structure, and even if compelled, most likely they are 
not interested in detailing their most capable and best qualified to join the center 
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(Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 13).65 On the other hand, for non-federal 
stakeholders, detailing personnel is directly tied to the availability of funding and 
incentives to cover their personnel costs to join the program.66 While these 
potential problems may be overcome with adequate funding and the influence 
and power of the Vice President, the availability of qualified and experienced 
planners is another matter.  
In today’s homeland security environment, planners are a high-demand 
low-density commodity. Unlike the Department of Defense, which has developed 
a robust planner cadre over the years, most federal agencies lack this capability, 
and as consequence, active and retired military planners have become the 
principal source of talent at the federal level (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 
45). DHS established a planner’s course for stakeholders to address this 
shortcoming and similar initiatives are underway in the Department of Defense 
and in academia to try to fill this gap (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 48).67 
Non-federal jurisdictions, the private sector and NGOs have a limited pool of 
planners as well and the current economic climate makes it even worst since no 
excess capacity exists in personnel resources. Detailing planners away from their 
parent federal agencies and non-federal stakeholders could create gaps in their 
planning capabilities, especially during emergencies or incidents, because most 
organizations use their planners for both deliberate planning and crisis action 
planning. The design plan for establishing the center should consider this and 
make the necessary adjustments to minimize impact. For instance, the center 
may have to develop a training program for its initial staff just as the IMPT did 
when it started (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. 48). Training and incentives 
could be a good approach to reduce stakeholder pain as it may be a win-win as 
fully trained planners, who did their “residence” at someone else’s expense, 
                                            
65 Also in PNSR’s Towards Integrating Complex National Missions, p. 19. 
66 The private sector may need special incentives, such as tax breaks or some sort of 
internship program. DHS has a fellowship program for state and local personnel. 
67 Joint Forces Staff College and several academic institutions Google Key Word “Homeland 
Security Planning Course.” 
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return to their parent agencies eventually. This situation is strikingly similar to 
post 9/11 Intelligence Community struggle to fill the ranks of the counter terrorism 
centers with qualified and experienced intelligence analysts (Putbrese, 2006), 
since centers can become competitors for resources with offices in agencies. 
The heads of agencies are not willing to siphon away scarce resources to an 
activity over which they have no control (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 127). In the end, 
both the President and Congress can direct the appropriate level of resources 
from federal departments for a national priority just as they did for the creation of 
the NCTC.68 
2. Structure  
The  center  operates  in  a  legacy  federal  structure  essentially  hostile  to 
sharing resources and authorities. The proposal itself must get through the national 
security  interagency  system.  However,  it  is  likely  to  precipitate  the  same  type  of 
“food  fight”  experienced  in  the  intelligence  community  when  the  Bush 
Administration established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the 
NCTC  (Zegart,  2007,  pp.  181–186).  The  interagency  system’s  analysis, planning, 
and implementation are driven by organizational equities, paradigms, and 
incentive structures that decrease interagency cooperation. Furthermore, the 
processes of the interagency system provide ample filibustering opportunities 
that can only be overcome by sustained presidential engagement (Project for 
National Security Reform, 2008, p. 95). Three issues at this level can be used to 
torpedo the creation of the center. First, the federal agencies can argue that the 
current system can be improved (more governance) and that the center 
interferes with their statutory responsibilities if given authority for regulating and 
measuring federal performance. Second, the NSC may have concerns about 
establishing a quasi-parallel structure for deliberate planning because it could de- 
 
 
                                            
68 EO and Legislation. 
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link policy and strategy from deliberate planning. Lastly, the center requires a 
major revision of the current federal planning architecture under HSPD-8 and the 
Integrated Planning System, which can impact on non-federal jurisdictions.  
These potential agency arguments reflect the same conventional wisdom 
that led to the intelligence failures of 9/11 and the response failures during 
Hurricane Katrina. The premise is that governance, or in other words, a mandate 
to integrate, results in actual interagency cooperation, coordination and 
synchronization. As seen previously, the case history does not support this 
premise since the U.S. planning system, and by most estimates, the nation, is 
not ready for another catastrophe (Wormuth & Witkowsky, 2008, p. VI). 
Moreover, similar agency arguments were made by the intelligence community 
after 9/11 and persist to this day as agencies continue to resist any effort to 
increase authorities for the NCTC (Project for National Security Reform, 2010, p. 
18).69 According to a PNSR report, the National Counterterrorism Center itself 
identified several key challenges to its effectiveness early in the planning 
process, highlighting the confusion about agencies’ roles and responsibilities and 
the need to reconcile its statutory mandate to integrate across the 
counterterrorism mission set with existing departmental authorities in this area 
(Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 230). Yet, no credible proposals 
exist to dismantle the NCTC and return the Intelligence Community to its pre 9/11 
structure. On the contrary, the trend is towards increasing its authorities. The 
effectiveness of the NHSPC, like the NCTC, depends on the level of authorities 
to perform its integration and assessment functions. Hence, the establishment of 
the center, even on a “light” configuration like the NCTC, is a better option than 
the status quo and has the potential to yield high dividends by closing a structural 
void in the catastrophic planning system. 
 
                                            
69 See also Zegart’s Spying Blind, p. 182. 
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Even though the center is a better option, it requires some sort of 
integration into the National Security System. The proposal recognizes this by 
establishing a reporting chain to the Vice President and suggesting a possible 
reporting chain to the National Security Advisor. The NSC Staff does not have 
the structure, manpower or authority to provide oversight over the federal 
planning system adequately. Over the years, the NSC staff has acquired a broad 
range of functions while remaining relatively small.  
 Policy functions: developing, coordinating, and integrating national 
security policies and strategies; monitoring and coordinating the 
implementation of these policies and strategies; assessing the 
progress of policies and strategies; and managing and planning for 
crises.  
 Administrative functions: some of which are performed by the 
executive secretariat, including such important activities as 
managing the paper flow, scheduling meetings, preparing meeting 
agendas, taking meeting notes, summarizing discussions and 
decisions, and disseminating guidance throughout the national 
security system.  
 Staffing functions for the president: preparing briefing books, 
accompanying the president on foreign trips, and assisting with 
speech writing, among other things (Project for National Security 
Reform, 2010, p. 126)  
 Total number around 266 (Project for National Security Reform, 
2008, p. 165). 
As seen earlier in the previous chapter, real-world real-time demands take 
priority over less time critical deliberate planning. The staff becomes a 
bottleneck, not by intent, but because only it can provide effective integration 
(Project for National Security Reform, 2008, p. 166). Therefore, setting a parallel 
structure for catastrophic deliberate planning that has appropriate links to the 
national security system can, in fact, help reduce the span of control and work 
load of the NSC allowing it to focus on more pressing and critical issues. Again, 
the precedent of the NCTC, which currently performs the same function for the 
intelligence community, provides justification to set aside any concerns about de-
linking policy and strategy from the catastrophic planning process. The center  
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with appropriate authorities would go a step further; it would provide a structure 
by which to measure the implementation of policy, which does not exist under the 
current framework.  
The current framework, as explained in Chapter III, is comprehensive in 
content but not substance. The Obama Administration has signaled that it 
intends to issue a new HSPD-8 and replace the IPS with a new National 
Planning System. Thus, the argument that the system must be revised is 
essentially moot. As previously discussed, the notional structure above is an 
ideal end state that requires both an executive order and legislation for 
appropriate resources and authorities. On the other hand, the administration may 
elect to field a CNCP-Light by an executive order, just as President Bush did with 
the NCTC, and keep its focus on integrating the federal effort and providing a 
seat at the table for non-federal stakeholders to influence the development of 
federal plans. The planning capabilities and structures of non-federal 
stakeholders do present some challenges, specifically with non-federal 
government jurisdictions at the regional level.  
While regional and state level planning structures are not within the scope 
of this thesis, some pertinent observations have implications on the viability and 
effectiveness of the proposed CNCP. The United States consists of 50 states, five 
territories and the District of Columbia, all of which are as distinct and diverse as 
the demographics of the nation. The emergency planning systems and 
capabilities reflect that diversity and the level of resources that non-federal 
jurisdictions can afford. In 2006, DHS led a systematic national effort to assess 
the status of emergency plans in the states and major urban areas. At the time, 
the study found that the status of plans provided grounds for a significant national 
concern because current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and not linked 
within a national planning system (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, 
p. VIII).  
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Since then, DHS has taken steps to strengthen the 10 FEMA regions and 
improve regional preparedness but progress has been uneven (Project for 
National Security Reform, 2009, p. 19). The federal departments are expected to 
support the FEMA regions, but the arrangement is identical as in the federal level 
because FEMA does not have the authority to direct their support. DoD is 
supporting FEMA’s effort with a pilot program in five states to strengthen 
catastrophic planning at the state and regional level using the concept of a Task 
Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER). The initiative is underway in five 
elected states (NORAD and USNORTHCOM, 2008). In theory, it is possible that 
the FEMA regions in cooperation with the states and the regional offices of 
federal departments may be able to develop fully integrated catastrophic regional 
plans but the void in the operational planning system at the federal level makes 
coordination and synchronization impossible. Therefore, the establishment of a 
CNCP is not incompatible with the current regional planning framework. On the 
contrary, it provides a structure in which the FEMA regions can coordinate and 
synchronize their plans with those of the federal agencies and the federal 
government in general. Moreover, the CNCP provides the states a one-stop entry 
point for federal operational planning instead of the 30+ agency stovepipes that 
exist today. Currently, the states have to discern what agency is doing what and 
approach them separately to gain visibility over their operational plans.  
3. Interagency Resistance 
The CNCP could be a pill too hard to swallow because it requires federal 
agencies to provide resources and possibly to yield some of their traditional 
authorities. Volumes of narratives exist that document interagency resistance to 
any consolidation of functions dating back to the creation of the interagency 
system in 1947. The naissance of the Departments of Transportation and 
Energy, as well as the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization of the Department of 
Defense, offer a wealth of war stories on the protracted fights that occurred 
before and after these initiatives got under way. The President and Congress can 
legally create a structure with a stroke of a pen, but making it into a fully 
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functional and effective real structure can take years (Jr., Hegland, & Kritz, 
2002). Both DHS and the NCTC are the poster children for this very serious 
concern, as they are the product of protracted internal and external battles for 
control over resources, authorities and missions.70 Likewise, in the case of the 
CNCP, these three issues generate ample opportunities for federal stakeholders 
along the way to veto or declaw what they may perceive as a threat to power, 
priorities and resources. 
This consideration is relevant since it impacts the level of effectiveness of 
the CNCP. The stakeholders can pressure both the executive branch and 
Congress to weaken any authorities and resource allocations that infringe on 
their equities. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act is an 
example of the power of these forces that led to a significant weakening of 
authorities for the Director of National Intelligence and the NCTC (Zegart, 2007, 
p. 182). Weak authorities leave the center as at the mercy of the federal 
departments for quality manning resources and inhibit its ability to direct 
compliance with catastrophic planning efforts mirroring the NCTC experience 
(Reinwald, Assessing The National Counterterrorism Center's Effectiveness, 
2007, p. 12). The end result is that the CNCP must be totally dependent upon 
willing interagency compliance and cooperation, or in its absence, increase 
oversight from the Vice President (Reinwald, Assessing The National 
Counterterrorism Center's Effectiveness, 2007, p. 8).  
On the other hand, too much authority may make the center an EPA type 
agency that can inadvertently increase the burden on federal and non-federal 
stakeholders by over regulating catastrophic planning to the point that it can lead 
to major inefficiencies in the system and restrict the operational effectiveness of 
the departments. They can also mandate a one size fits all approach, which is 
absolutely not feasible, as every department has its own structures and 
resources. This means that the authorities given to the center must be balanced 
                                            
70 Amy Zegart’s in Spying Blind provides a narrative and anecdotes on these struggles in the 
context of Intelligence (pp. 173–186). 
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to account for the consequences of both extremes. However, even a weakened 
center, similar to the NCTC, is a better option than the current system or more 
governance. The NCTC today is widely considered one of the most successful 
improvements in U.S. intelligence (Zegart, 2007, p. 186). Even in its weakened 
configuration, the NCTC has been able to reasonably coordinate and 
synchronize the nation’s counterterrorism planning efforts. If this is the 70% 
solution, then a CNCP is definitely a better option while waiting for system wide 
reform. 
E. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The proposal presented in this chapter goes a long way in changing the 
status quo that has paralyzed the federal government deliberate planning system 
for decades. It is built on the areas of consensus shared by the homeland 
security community of interest. In its basic form, it emulates at the federal level 
the separation of the planning and operations functions that intelligence 
community achieved with the NCTC. The experience of the intelligence 
community is highly relevant since it is the most hostile environment in which a 
model of this kind can be tested. If the NCTC is able to some degree bring 
synchronization and coordination to this highly competitive and contentious 
environment, clearly the CNCP can do as well in leading the nation’s deliberate 
planning effort for catastrophes and achieve success as well.  
It establishes a structure that unambiguously communicates that 
catastrophic planning is a national priority by allocating dedicated resources and 
authorities. The center allows the federal government to appropriately maintain a 
focus on deliberate planning even when other national priorities or crises arise 
that compete for the attention of the national leadership. This is not the case 
under the current system where real-time real-world events tend to place 
deliberate planning on the back burner. Rather than hoping that all the federal 
agencies develop the capacity and drive for catastrophic planning, the center 
becomes a catalyst to push the process gently with appropriate, but firm 
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authorities to make the nation ready for the next Super Bowl of catastrophes. It 
breaks out of the box by establishing a fully supportable integrated multi-sector 
structure that incorporates all the elements of national power. This structure is 
essential to identify the wealth of capabilities traditionally overlooked for 
achieving a fully integrated national response posture as well for identifying 
critical gaps that must be addressed.  
The CNCP in its robust configuration can become the mechanism for 
developing the end-to-end processes by assessing, evaluating and testing 
deliberate plans and providing a reporting system that can track the level of 
compliance with national policy. It provides the potential for establishing a 
national Center of Excellence that can lead the effort to develop a truly integrated 
national planning system. The model’s structure effectively minimizes the span of 
control of the President and significantly reduces the burden on the NSC 
interagency system, while providing an equally effective leadership structure. The 
Vice-President and the Board of Governors provide enough horsepower top 
cover to coax the support of federal departments and establish credibility with 
non-federal stakeholders, respectively. The center gives deliberate planning a 
stable structure not subject to major shifts with the change of administrations. In 
essence, it provides a venue for the federal government to develop a 
professional planner cadre for the whole community of interest. The center 
structure is fully compatible with the current FEMA region planning structure and 
reduces the coordination stovepipes for non-federal stakeholders. Lastly, the 
center performs its primary mission, for the first time in history, the nation has a 
structure that can effectively coordinate, synchronize and validate federal 
operational plans for the nightmare worst cases of the national planning 
scenarios. It is neither perfect, nor without defects and does not have any 
guarantees. Nevertheless, it moves the federal planning out of the paralytic 
status quo that had led to failures during past catastrophes and places it on the 
path towards the future. 
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No ironclad guarantees exist in a profession that combats terrorists and 
nature. Even the best plans do not always deliver success. The historian Henry 
Adams said, “in all great emergencies, everyone is more or less wrong.” 
Planners cannot foresee every outcome, and incident managers cannot 
anticipate every scenario. While disasters have a language of their own and no 
plan can guarantee success, inadequate plans are proven contributors to failure. 
The results of the Nationwide Plan Review support fundamental planning 
modernization. Vince Lombardi said, “we’re going to relentlessly chase perfection 
knowing full well we will not catch it because perfection is unattainable. But we 
are going to relentlessly chase it because in the process we will catch 
excellence” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 80). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS  
The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and 
expecting different results.  
 Rita Mae Brown, Sudden Death 
Every Body cries, a Union is absolutely necessary, but when they 
come to the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noodles are 
perfectly distracted.  
 Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Peter Collinson, December 29, 1754 
 
A. DISCOVERY 
When the author began this research project in the spring of 2009, he was 
largely convinced that the inability of the federal government to establish a viable 
chain of command led to the failures experienced during Hurricane Katrina. This 
belief was influenced by his military background as well as his experience while 
serving in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Washington Office in the Pentagon. 
During and after the storm, the office sent liaison officers to the nations’ key 
command centers responsible for managing the federal response to gain 
situational awareness of their efforts and facilitate coordination for 
USNORTHCOM.71 From this vantage point, the author watched as the 
Department of Defense mobilized its vast capabilities and USNORTHCOM 
moved them (equipment and people) as fast as humanly possible to the disaster 
area; it was not enough. The catastrophe absorbed these resources as if there 
was no end; everyone watched the response effort on TV and witnessed the 
level of confusion and frustration that reached a crescendo when the graphic 
images from within the Superdome told the story. At that point, the author made 
up his mind that the cause was the absence of a functional chain of command to 
                                            
71 FEMA, USAID, DHS, National Military Command Center, USAID, and the American Red 
Cross. 
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coordinate and synchronize the federal effort. What was missing was a 
“Conductor” with the power to harmonize the symphony of capabilities from all 
government agencies participating in the response effort. 
Unfortunately, the author’s conclusions proved premature and erroneous. 
He began his research by looking at the Joint Interagency Task Force South 
(JIATF-S) model, which was lauded for it success in coordinating and 
synchronizing federal interagency counter-drug operations. At the time, he was 
convinced that this proved that the timeless military principle of unity of command 
could be applied to interagency operations for federal catastrophe response just 
as JIATF-S was doing for counter-drug operations. That idea was quickly 
dispelled when a colleague arranged for him to visit with the Incident 
Management Planning Team at the DHS. Gently but firmly, he was told that there 
was no way that any federal department would submit to the authority of another 
department and much less to a military style chain of command. The author, 
somewhat disappointed that he had run into a dead end, decided to ask some 
follow up questions. What followed was a most enlightening and insightful 
exchange of information that led him in an unexpected direction for the research 
project. How many agency operational plans are there? Who is in charge of 
synchronizing these plans if they exist? How are the gaps and overlaps identified 
among these federal operational plans? Do all agencies have the capabilities and 
resources to conduct deliberate operational planning for catastrophes? The 
answers to these questions came as a total surprise. The federal planning 
system is built upon the premise that a governance framework, or, in plain terms 
guidance and directives, automatically result in system wide compliance and 
action. Translation: it is assumed that everyone is playing by the rules and 




B. RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
This exchange led to the research questions. First, it was necessary to 
develop an understanding of how the federal planning system was organized and 
look at its history to assess its prior performance. As seen previously, over the 
years, federal planning has become much more sophisticated, but the system 
itself has not changed much in its structure for decades. A substantial body of 
experts who have analyzed the shortcomings of the national and homeland 
security systems in detail echoed this theme. The federal government develops 
the governance framework, agencies comply, and hopefully, the system works as 
designed for the next catastrophe. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. For 
example, the first Federal Response Plan failed during Hurricane Andrew and 
how its replacement, the National Response Plan, did not perform any better 
during Hurricane Katrina. Once again, a new and more sophisticated framework 
in the form of the National Planning Guidelines, the Integrated Planning System 
and the National Response Framework, was created, but the basic premise of 
the system remains the same. Is it destined to fail during the next catastrophe? 
Most experts do not think it is up to the task.  
Second, the author had to review the governance framework to assess 
whether it was producing its intended outcomes. The answer to that is not quite. 
Although many great Americans have made a lot of effort, the system is falling 
significantly short of its own expectations. The government established a 
reasonable planning standard with the National Planning Scenarios to examine 
nightmare events that had the potential to cripple this nation. The government’s 
self-assessments and the expert’s assessments clearly indicate serious 
shortcomings in the development of deliberate plans to prepare for a single or 
multiple catastrophic-level events effectively. This issue is inextricably tied with 
the national security system since it uses the same structure and processes. The 
exploration of the proposals seeking to reform the system revealed a robust 
ongoing debate unable to crystallize into a consensus for short-term  
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implementation. Waiting for the next catastrophe to strike to reform the system is, 
needless to say, not an option, which led the author to explore how other 
countries organize their planning systems.  
From this analysis, the author presented three principles that can help the 
nation shape an interim improvement option for the planning system until the day 
the reform debate leads to system-wide reform. The separation of the planning 
and operations functions was examined and it was noted that it had been used in 
the past and continues to the present with the National Counter Terrorism Center 
(NCTC). The empowering Canadian legislation and its functional focus provided 
an idea of how to aim for an appropriate balance that may increase the 
effectiveness of interagency organizations. The NCTC and the EPA gave an 
example of the extremes, too little and too much. The New Zealand “cluster” 
served as a living example of multi-sector integration for emergency planning. 
The Armed Forces doctrine is employing a similar model in their Civil-Military 
Operations Center and the state of Florida is pursuing multi-sector integration 
using the mega-community model. 
Lastly, this analysis provided the lens by which to examine the areas of 
consensus in the reform debate and shape a proposal to improve the system in 
the short term. The author established five common denominators in the reform 
movement: 1) deliberate planning is extremely important and essential; 2) the 
system is likely to fail again unless improved; 3) any reform proposal, be it short 
or long term, must be fully integrated to include all levels of government, private 
sector and non-governmental organizations; 4) the system must include a 
structure to provide oversight over the processes to measure, test and validate 
the links from strategy to mission tasks; and 5) someone must be in charge.  
C. PROPOSAL: CENTER FOR NATIONAL CATASTROPHE PLANNING 
Using this framework, the author proposed the establishment of a Center 
for National Catastrophe Planning (CNCP) under a portfolio directed by the Vice 
President of the United States. This notional center can be established in a light 
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configuration like the NCTC by executive order or strengthened by legislation to 
included regulatory powers over catastrophic planning. Nevertheless, the center 
is a scalable and malleable model that could significantly increase the 
effectiveness of the national catastrophic planning system. The model addresses 
the major existing shortcoming in the system by providing a structure to 
coordinate, synchronize and validate federal catastrophe plans. It is a flexible 
model that can coexist and even interact with the regional framework that FEMA 
and DHS are trying to build. As an interim solution, significant drawbacks exist 
that need to be addressed. In the end, it is a matter of whether planning for 
national catastrophe(s) is a priority that must be fixed as soon as possible or 
something that can wait until the debate is over or the United States’ hand is 
forced by another failure.  
D. KNOWLEDGE GAP 
The research identified some areas in which significant knowledge gaps 
exist at the federal level. No one knows for sure whether all federal departments 
have developed and resourced deliberated planning capability for disasters as 
required by presidential directive and legislation. The underlying assumption, as 
noted previously, is that they have. Regardless if the CNCP proposal is accepted 
or not, this void must be filled since the existing planning framework is very 
dependent on the ability of the departments to fulfill these responsibilities outlined 
in policy, strategy and planning documents. As demonstrated during previous 
catastrophes, the assumption proved costly.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Some of the author’s colleagues asked what does this thesis has to with 
the Department of Defense, and for that matter, USNORTHCOM? They argued 
that this is an interagency problem that should be resolved by the DHS or the 
NSC. After some reflection, he had to answer…”everything; it is all about DoD 
and USNORTHCOM. We are not talking about the run of the mill recurring 
disaster; we are talking about the Big One, the unthinkable, the Super Bowl of 
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catastrophes.” Katrina as horrible as it was, did not take the nation down the 
abyss, it just took the United States to the edge and provided another look at 
what could be. It was a wake-up call that demonstrated that the cavalry, the 
military, no matter how capable and how vast its capabilities are, will not be 
enough. GAO showed how USNORTHCOM made substantial progress towards 
developing plans and capabilities to support the federal government response for 
the CBRNE scenarios. However, it also demonstrated that the rest of the federal 
government is lagging in developing the necessary plans. How will the United 
States be prepared if a lethal pandemic or multiple nuclear incidents in the 
homeland occurred? Can DoD and USNORTHCOM’s impressive capabilities and 
the military’s gallant effort save the day? History states that the odds are against 
them. Without a viable federal deliberate catastrophic planning system that can 
effectively harness all the elements of national power, purposefully minimize the 
capability gaps and overlaps, methodically coordinate and synchronize 
operational plans, and test and validate the whole of government effort, DoD and 
USNORTHCOM can be left to do a pick-up game. Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew and 
Katrina should remind everyone not to tempt fate again.  
Perhaps the experts are correct and the U.S. national security system is in 
dire need of an overhaul. When that happens, surely homeland security can be a 
significant part of that effort. Can the United States afford to wait until a 
consensus is reached or can it wait for the next catastrophe to force its hand, 
even when the worst case scenario, can bring the nation to its knees? This void 
in catastrophic planning must be filled. While optimizing governance can be the 
easiest approach to implement, it is doubtful that it can have a significant impact 
to deliver a fully synergistic operational planning system. The proposed center is 
not perfect, but it provides the best short-term option to fill the void with a proven 
approach to coordinate, synchronize and validate catastrophe operational plans. 
The time of independent action and planning by federal departments has long 
passed. More and more, the complex multi-dimensional and interdependent 
nature of the global environment requires the government to coordinate and 
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synchronize the application of national power fully. This can only be done by 
institutionalizing collaboration in multi-sector structures. The national motto “E 
Pluribus Unum,” or “Out of Many One” is a hint from the past that forcefully 
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